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COOPERATIVE PATENT PROSECUTION:
VIEWING PATENTS THROUGH A
PRAGMATICS LENS
KRISTEN OSENGA †
INTRODUCTION
Conversation is easy. We converse with other people daily.
Some of the communications are oral, occurring face-to-face or
over the telephone. Other conversations occur over a chain of emails or in real time, using instant messaging or chat room
technology. Sometimes the content of conversation is important
and informative. Conversations can propel business deals, peace
negotiations, or medical decisions. But other times the content is
not important at all; it may be mundane or even banal. Small
talk about the weather, the stock market, or local sports teams is
less about content and more about the social relationships it
helps develop and maintain. Regardless of its purpose and
regardless of its style, we use language to converse all the time
without much ado.
Patent law, by contrast, is hard.
The task of claim
construction—interpreting the words that patents use to
delineate the boundaries of the patentees’ exclusive rights 1—is
†
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thoughtful and detailed comments received from John Carroll, Kevin Collins, Jessica
Erickson, Jim Gibson, Timothy Holbrook, Corinna Lain, Michael Risch, and David
Schwartz. This Article also benefits from comments received at the 2009 IP
Roundtable at Columbus School of Law, Catholic University of America; the 2008
Intellectual Property Scholars Conference held at Stanford University; the Fall 2008
Virginia Junior Faculty Forum; and at a New Scholars panel of the 2008
Southeastern Association of Law Schools (SEALS) annual meeting. I am also
grateful for the research assistance of Justin Sheldon, Heather Walczak, and Randa
Zakhour.
1
See Zenith Labs., Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 19 F.3d 1418, 1424 (Fed.
Cir. 1994) (“It is the claim that sets the metes and bounds of the invention entitled
to the protection of the patent system.”); Craig Allen Nard, A Theory of Claim
Interpretation, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 3 (2000).
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one of the most important aspects of patent law but also one of
the most difficult. Judges have called claim construction “a
special occupation,” 2 “a mongrel practice,” 3 even “impossible,” 4
and for good reason. Interpretation of the terms used in a patent
remains basically a crap-shoot, with the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversing trial court claim
construction determinations in 33% to 50% of patent cases. 5 It is
little wonder that claim construction has drawn much criticism
from scholars. 6 Claim construction may well be the most difficult
and misunderstood aspect of patent law.
So why is there so much ado about claim construction? Some
say that claim construction is hard because the information
conveyed by the words is of great consequence. But this alone
cannot explain why claim construction is the subject of so much
discussion; there is an awful lot of important information
conveyed in everyday conversation as well, but without all of the
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 388 (1996) (“Patent
construction in particular ‘is a special occupation, requiring, like all others, special
training and practice.’ ” (quoting Parker v. Hulme, 18 F. Cas. 1138, 1140 (C.C.E.D.
Pa. 1849))).
3
Id. at 378.
4
Thurber Corp. v. Fairchild Motor Corp., 269 F.2d 841, 850 (5th Cir. 1959)
(“There is no question but what the claims are complex and drafted with language
and in a style that makes them difficult if not impossible for laymen—and indeed,
for most lawyers and judges—to understand.”).
5
The Federal Circuit is the appellate court with primary responsibility for
patent cases. Various empirical studies have calculated that Federal Circuit reversal
rates based on claim construction errors are between 30% and 50%. See, e.g., Cybor
Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1476 & n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc)
(Rader, J., dissenting) (noting that reversal rates were “hovering near 50%” for cases
decided in 1995 through 1997); Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges
Equipped To Resolve Patent Cases?, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 2, 4 (2001) (finding a
reversal rate of 33% over the time period 1996 to 2000); Christian A. Chu, Note,
Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s Claim Construction Trends, 16 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1075, 1092, 1098 (2001) (finding a reversal rate of 47.3% over the time
period January 1, 1998 to April 30, 2000).
6
The number of articles written that criticize claim construction is legion. For
just a few examples, see John M. Golden, Construing Patent Claims According to
Their “Interpretive Community”: A Call for an Attorney-Plus-Artisan Perspective, 21
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 321, 327 (2008); Timothy R. Holbrook, Substantive Versus
Process-Based Formalism in Claim Construction, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 123, 125–
26 (2005); Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Measure of the Doubt: Dissent, Indeterminacy, and
Interpretation at the Federal Circuit, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 1025, 1030 (2007); Kelly
Casey Mullally, Patent Hermeneutics: Form and Substance in Claim Construction,
59 FLA. L. REV. 333, 343 (2007); David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An
Empirical Study of Claim Construction Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L.
REV. 223, 227 (2008).
2
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trouble that accompanies claim construction.
Another
explanation is that patent claims include scientific jargon that is
nearly impossible to understand. But the reality is that, more
often than not, parties litigate over simple words being used just
as they would be in everyday conversation. Words like “a,” “or,”
“to,” “on,” “about,” “including,” and “through” have been the
subject of claim construction disputes. 7 For the most part,
patents are like everyday conversation, relying on language to
convey information from one party to another and serving as an
exchange of information between an inventor, the Patent Office,
and the public.
Despite the significance of language and communication in
patent law, and law generally, legal scholars have shown
surprisingly little interest in linguistics—the study of language
and how we understand it—and even less interest in
pragmatics—the study of how context enriches content. 8 This is
odd, given the importance of interpretation and construction in
all areas of the law. 9 The few scholars that have adopted a
linguistics-based framework to examine legal communication
have focused on statutory language and its relation to everyday
conversation. 10 But despite the volumes of scholarly analysis
devoted to claim construction thus far, no one has considered the

7
See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Quantum Patent Mechanics, 9 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 29, 53 (2005); see also Golden, supra note 6, at 338–39; David
Krinsky, The Supreme Court, Stare Decisis, and the Role of Appellate Deference in
Patent Claim Construction Appeals, 66 MD. L. REV. 194, 205 (2006) (“[D]isputed
claim terms, even for technical patents, are often not terms of art, but rather are
ordinary English words given their everyday meanings.”).
8
See Elizabeth Fajans & Mary R. Falk, Linguistics and the Composition of
Legal Documents: Border Crossings, 22 LEGAL STUD. F. 697, 697 (1998).
9
For the sake of completeness, there is a difference between interpretation and
construction in law. Particularly, interpretation is determining the linguistic
meaning or semantics of a legal text, while construction is translating the
interpretation into a set of legal rules. These distinctions do have some relevance,
but in patent law, as well as in this piece, we find the two terms used
interchangeably.
10
See Andrei Marmor, The Pragmatics of Legal Language, 21 RATIO JURIS 423
(2008); Geoffrey P. Miller, Pragmatics and the Maxims of Interpretation, 1990 WIS.
L. REV. 1179, 1182–83; M.B.W. Sinclair, Law and Language: The Role of Pragmatics
in Statutory Interpretation, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 373, 374 (1985).
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implications of linguistics theory in intellectual property law. 11 It
is time to examine patent claim construction through a
conversational linguistics lens.
In particular, by viewing patents as conversations, we can
take advantage of the rich body of work that has been developed
in linguistics to understand more clearly the source of
indeterminacy in patent claim construction. Various doctrines of
claim construction make perfect sense when viewed through the
conversation lens. And a linguistics-based approach shows us
that, contrary to mainstream patent literature, the existing
process for claim construction is actually pretty good. In fact,
given linguistic limitations, claim construction is about as good
as it is going to get.
But if it is true that both everyday conversation and patent
conversation are similar exchanges of information, why is
claim construction difficult where understanding everyday
conversation is not? There is one stark difference between these
two types of conversation: Everyday conversation is easy because
it is the result of a cooperative enterprise, while patent
conversation is purposefully and pragmatically non-cooperative.
It is not until we consider the exchange of patent information as
a conversation and apply a conversational linguistics approach to
claim construction that we realize the value of this insight:
Claim construction can only be improved if we can raise the level
of cooperation in the conversations that result in the grant of a
patent. To inject cooperation into the patent prosecution process,
we need to provide incentives to both the inventor and the Patent
Office to act cooperatively. We also need to change patent
prosecution and claim construction rules to create and benefit
from a more cooperative atmosphere. Finally, we need to take
advantage of this new air of cooperation by institutionalizing the
11
One intellectual property scholar, Joseph Scott Miller, has acknowledged the
conversational linguistic aspects of the patent document. Miller does not
contemplate the differences between a patent and ordinary conversation, however;
rather, he relies on the basic conversation implicature to bolster the need for
ordinary meaning in the claim construction process. See Joseph Scott Miller,
Enhancing Patent Disclosure for Faithful Claim Construction, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 177, 189 (2005). Other scholars, such as John R. Thomas, have made the
observation that the patent acquisition process looks like a conversation but have
not explored a conversational linguistic approach. See John R. Thomas, On
Preparatory Texts and Proprietary Technologies: The Place of Prosecution Histories
in Patent Claim Interpretation, 47 UCLA L. REV. 183, 184 (1999) (calling the patent
prosecution process a “dialogue”).
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shared background knowledge of the parties to the conversation,
present by proxy as a person having ordinary skill in the art. By
making these changes, we can take advantage of conversational
linguistic insights to improve the outcome of the existing claim
construction processes.
This Article constructs a linguistics-based framework to
consider claim construction and demonstrates that the often-told
story that claim construction is broken is, in fact, wrong. Rather,
it is the underlying conversations that comprise the patent
acquisition process that are to blame. In Part I of this Article, I
use linguistics to describe the characteristics of everyday
conversation, as well as how it is interpreted. In Part II, I
explain what patent conversations look like and how they are
similar to and different from everyday conversation. In Part III,
I apply the theories of interpreting everyday conversation to
patent conversation. Breaking from tradition, I assert that claim
construction is not broken; much claim construction methodology
aligns with how we interpret everyday conversation. Claim
construction is as good as it can be, given linguistic limitations.
The problem is the patent conversation itself, specifically the
communications that occur between the inventor and the Patent
Office that give rise to an issued patent. I close, in Part IV, by
explaining how cooperation can—and should—be injected into
the patent conversation and how a cooperative patent
conversation leads to improved claim construction.
I.

EVERYDAY CONVERSATION

Linguistics scholars have long realized that cooperation is
the key to communication. 12 It is this cooperation that is lacking
in patent conversations. To understand how increasing the level
of cooperation in patent conversations can lead to better claim
construction determinations, we first need to examine the
characteristics of everyday conversation and discuss how
cooperation adds context to content in interpreting everyday
speech. Only then can we apply what we know about everyday
conversation to patent conversation.

12
See Jens Allwood, Cooperation, Competition, Conflict and Communication 1
(Gothenburg
Papers
in
Theoretical
Linguistics,
2007),
available
at
http://www.hprints.org/docs/00/46/04/98/PDF/gupea_2077_21865_1.pdf.
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Characteristics of Everyday Conversation

At its most basic level, conversation is an exchange between
a speaker, or sender, of information and a hearer, or receiver, of
information. 13 Conversation relies on language, and there is an
assumption that both the speaker and the hearer are fluent in
the language of the exchange. Although not typically considered
a “conversation,” everyday writing shares the feature of being an
exchange of information that relies on language and can be
viewed as a conversation. 14 In everyday conversation, the parties
may take alternating roles in communicating or acting as the
speaker; this is known as bilateral conversation. 15 When the
conversation is bilateral, the hearer can clarify any lack of
understanding by simply asking the speaker. The hearer,
however, need not become a speaker for communication to occur.
When only one party is conveying information, this is known as
unilateral conversation. 16 With this type of communication, the
speaker’s clarity becomes more important because there is no
opportunity to seek clarification. Regardless of whether the
conversation is unilateral or bilateral, the underlying theme of
everyday conversation is an assumption that the speaker intends
to convey some type of information to the hearer, who will
understand that information is being conveyed. 17
To facilitate the exchange of content, the speaker implicitly
promises to convey information to the hearer that is not already
known and that is relevant, or at least closely enough related, to
what the hearer already knows so that the hearer can make a

See Henry E. Smith, The Language of Property: Form, Context, and Audience,
55 STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1133 (2003).
14
See Fajans & Falk, supra note 8, at 718–19. Writing is also subject to the
same concerns discussed below:
Because writing is a communicative act, a writer must assess the
audience’s knowledge and inferencing capacities and supply what the
audience needs to decode or discern the text’s purpose and meaning. This
suggests that no text is sufficient unto itself; all texts rely on a reader’s
extra-textual knowledge, knowledge that helps the reader process the text.
Id. at 718.
15
See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 184 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “bilateral” as
“[a]ffecting or obligating both parties”).
16
See id. at 1671 (defining “unilateral” as “[o]ne sided; relating to only one of
two or more persons or things”).
17
DAN SPERBER & DIERDRE WILSON, COMMUNICATION & COGNITION 116 (2d ed.
1995). Whether or not he actually understands the information conveyed depends on
many factors, including the skill of the speaker in conveying it.
13
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connection. 18 Of course, this is not strictly true. As mentioned
above, conversation is sometimes not informative or is
informative but irrelevant; these types of conversation are useful
to create or maintain social relationships. 19 However, the hearer
generally expects that the speaker will be “informative, truthful,
relevant, clear, unambiguous, brief, and orderly.” 20 This mutual
pairing of guarantee and expectation allows for efficient
conversation, ideally free of ambiguity and missing pieces. 21 It
also means that it should be apparent to the parties when the
information intended to be conveyed differs from the speech’s
semantic content, in other words, the plain meaning of the words
of the utterance. 22 Everyday conversation is thus cooperative
because the speaker and the hearer share an expectation that
full and accurate information is being conveyed.
These cooperative ideals further shape other characteristics
of everyday conversation. Conversations can occur between any
two or more parties. To succeed in the goal of conveying
information, the speaker’s style may vary based on the
composition of the audience. In every conversation, members of
the audience can be classified into four categories: addressees,
auditors, overhearers, and eavesdroppers. 23 An addressee is
intended to hear the speaker’s utterance. 24 An auditor is known
by the speaker to be listening and the auditor’s presence is
ratified, or accepted, by the speaker; he is not, however, the
target of the speaker’s utterance. 25 An overhearer is known to be
listening, but the overhearer’s presence is not ratified. 26 Finally,
18
See Paul E. McGreal, Slighting Context: On the Illogic of Ordinary Speech in
Statutory Interpretation, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 325, 346 (2004) (quoting STEVEN
PINKER, THE LANGUAGE INSTINCT: HOW THE MIND CREATES LANGUAGE 228 (1994)).
19
See JAMES R. HURFORD, BRENDAN HEASLEY, MICHAEL B. SMITH, SEMANTICS:
A COURSEBOOK 4–5 (2d ed. 2008).
20
See McGreal, supra note 18 (quoting PINKER, supra note 18).
21
See id. at 345 (“Cooperation is not simply a matter of style, making
conversation more concise; it makes communication more efficient by increasing a
speaker’s speed and clarity. Speed affects a conversation’s cost because, as
economists know, time is money.”).
22
See Marmor, supra note 10, at 428 (“A speaker would normally succeed in
conveying assertive content that differs from what he says, when it would be obvious
to the hearer, in the particular context of the conversation, that it just cannot be the
case that the speaker asserts exactly what he says.”).
23
See Smith, supra note 13, at 1134.
24
See id.
25
See id.
26
See id.
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the speaker is unaware of the listening by an eavesdropper. 27
Based on the composition of the audience and the content of
information, a speaker may wish to convey information so that it
is made available to all hearers. In other cases, the speaker,
knowing the audience, may adjust the content to target only the
addressee. For example, if a speaker is trying to convey that ice
cream may be available after dinner to an adult addressee in the
presence of a child auditor—or perhaps overhearer, as children
go—the speaker may be purposefully more abstruse and indirect
in conveying the information so as not to excite the child who has
not yet finished his entrée.
Aside from the idea of different categories of hearers, other
aspects about the composition of the audience help the speaker
choose how to convey information. For example, a speaker may
use an alternate tone or even different word choices when talking
to adult addressees versus child addressees. To an adult, the
speaker may simply say “This place is a mess!” whereas to a
child, the speaker may need to succinctly spell out that the child
needs to tidy the room, and soon.
Conversations occur in any number of places and at any
number of times. These factors can also affect the characteristics
of a conversation. The content may differ based on whether the
conversation is formal or informal. Formal situations generally
call for more reliance on content and less reliance on context by
using more nouns and fewer pronouns, leaving less to the
hearer’s interpretation and imagination. 28 Formal situations also
are more likely to extend beyond the two-party, familiar
conversation and to include additional parties, such as
overhearers and eavesdroppers. 29 Because the speaker may be
less informed about the audience composition, the amount of
content required to convey the information may increase to
compensate for a lack of certainty about the background
Finally, formal
knowledge shared with the audience. 30

See id.
See id. at 1135. As an aside, some languages, like Spanish, have entirely
separate verb conjugation forms for formal circumstances versus informal. For
example, consider the conjugation of “hablar” or “to speak”; the phrase “you speak” is
rendered “tú hablas” in the familiar and “usted habla” in more formal conversation.
29
See id. at 1113.
30
See id. at 1136 (“[S]peakers are more explicit in more anonymous,
communicative settings.”). This need for extra explicit speech comes at a cost to the
27
28
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conversations are more likely than informal conversations to be
unilateral, again imposing a need for additional content in the
absence of the ability to seek clarification. 31 As will be described
below, 32 conversations in patent law share many of the
characteristics of formal conversation. 33
B. How We Interpret Everyday Conversation
Part of the appeal of using everyday conversation as a
framework for examining claim construction in patent law is its
simplicity. We generally understand these conversations without
thinking much about them. In fact, we communicate with words
without explicitly defining the words or adhering to rigid rules as
to their usage—yet, communication occurs and the hearer
As noted above, the content conveyed by
understands. 34
conversation is enhanced by context; together, content and
context create the meaning. 35
Although participants to everyday conversation may not give
much thought to the process of communication, there is a field of
study—linguistics—that is concerned with all aspects of
language, ranging from how sounds are formed, to what words
mean, to how words are grouped together to convey ideas. 36 The
branch of linguistics that most informs our understanding of
everyday conversation is pragmatics. 37 Pragmatics includes the
study of how “utterances” 38 become communication and, in
speaker, who is required to choose his words more carefully and cannot rely on any
extra-speech signals. See id. at 1136–37.
31
See id. at 1149.
32
See infra Part II.
33
Patent conversation tends to be written, whereas everyday conversation can
be either oral or written. However, the study of linguistics is appropriate in both
cases because at bottom we are dealing with a question of language. As linguist
Leonard Bloomfield remarked, “writing is not language, but merely a way of
recording language by means of visible marks.” LEONARD BLOOMFIELD, LANGUAGE
21 (1933). Thus, the application of linguistic concepts to patent conversation is as
apt as applying linguistics to everyday conversation.
34
See McGreal, supra note 18, at 334.
35
See supra Part I.A.
36
See, e.g., Kristen Osenga, Linguistics and Patent Claim Construction, 38
RUTGERS L.J. 61, 84–85 (2006).
37
See Kepa Korta & John Perry, Pragmatics, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pragmatics (Nov. 28, 2006).
38
See HURFORD, HEASLEY & SMITH, supra note 19, at 16–17 (defining an
“utterance” as a stretch of talk preceded and followed by silence, compared to a
“sentence” or string of words put together following the rules of grammar).
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particular, how context surrounding an utterance provides
additional content. Specifically, pragmatics differentiates “what
words mean, what the speaker literally says when using them,
and what the speaker means or intends to communicate by using
those words, which often goes considerably beyond what is
said.” 39
1.

Understanding Content

Content in conversation comes from the words used and how
they are put together. Word meanings can be expressed in two
ways, by referent or by sense. 40 The referent of a particular
expression is the thing or person to which it refers; you say the
word “dog” and point to a terrier sitting on the floor next to you. 41
The sense of a particular expression, in contrast, is an
abstraction, not a physical thing that can be pointed to. 42
Dictionaries are full of words or expressions that have the same
sense. 43 This means that the word “dog” in the dictionary does
not refer to a particular terrier nor to any other breed of dog
sitting on the floor next to you; it simply points in the direction of
other words that mean the same thing, such as “canine.” While
dictionaries help to understand the meanings of words, they
cannot be used in the first instance—for example, an English
dictionary cannot be used to help a non-native speaker learn his
first English word—because expressions are defined via other

Korta & Perry, supra note 37. However, the field of near-sided pragmatics
does have relevance in patent interpretation. See GEORGIA M. GREEN, PRAGMATICS
AND NATURAL LANGUAGE UNDERSTANDING 1 (2d ed. 1996) (“Pragmatics is the study
of the mechanisms that [allow us to] use the term communicate interchangeably
with speak or write, never noticing that the term communication presupposes
achievement of the intended effect of verbal action upon the addressee, while
speaking and writing do not. . . . Communication is, rather, the successful
interpretation by an addressee of a speaker’s intent in performing a linguistic act.”);
Paul F. Kirgis, Meaning, Intention, and the Hearsay Rule, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV.
275, 297 (2001) (“Communication is an act, and it is an act motivated by an intention
to produce certain beliefs in an audience . . . . Meaning is thus a function of [the
utterer’s] intention and the belief in [the audience] that [the utterer] seeks to
produce.”).
40
See HURFORD, HEASLEY & SMITH, supra note 19, at 26; Kevin Emerson
Collins, The Reach of Literal Claim Scope into After-Arising Technology: On Thing
Construction and the Meaning of Meaning, 41 CONN. L. REV. 493, 541 (2008).
41
See HURFORD, HEASLEY & SMITH, supra note 19, at 31.
42
See id.
43
See id. at 32.
39
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expressions of the same sense or abstraction. 44 Telling a nonnative speaker that a “dog” is a “canine” is not helpful. 45 When
interpreting the content of everyday conversation, it is safe to
assume that competent speakers and hearers of the language
know what is meant, at least generally. 46 Once a hearer has a
critical mass of understanding about the stable meaning of words
in a language, the hearer can quickly grasp different
conversational and social uses of the same words. 47
It is tempting to think that content alone is all that is
required for communication. Admittedly there is a certain
appeal to taking words at face value or following the “plain text”
movement of interpretation, if you will. The adage “[s]ay what
you mean and mean what you say” has appeared in various
forms and fora, ranging from a dialog in Alice’s Adventures in
Wonderland 48 to quotations from Dr. Seuss 49 and General George
S. Patton, 50 not to mention as an exhortation from parents and
teachers over the years. If we could simply rely on the content
conveyed in the utterance itself, the interpretive process would
be greatly streamlined.
Unfortunately, the benefits of an
economical interpretive methodology, such as plain text, are
outweighed by the additional content that can be derived from
context. In short, context is required.
See id.
This is true unless, of course, the non-native speaker is fluent in Latin.
46
See HURFORD, HEASLEY & SMITH, supra note 19, at 7.
47
See id. at 6.
48
LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE’S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND 62 (Delacorte
Press/Seymour Lawrence 1977) (1865).
“Then you should say what you mean,” the March Hare went on.
“I do,” Alice hastily replied; “at least—at least I mean what I say—that’s
the same thing, you know.”
“Not the same thing a bit!” said the Hatter. “Why, you might just as well
say that ‘I see what I eat’ is the same thing as ‘I eat what I see’!”
Id.
49
Although the quote “Say what you mean and mean what you say, because
those who mind don’t matter and those who matter don’t mind,” appears in multiple
places on the Internet attributed to Dr. Seuss, it is possible that the quote is actually
a conflation of two quotes by Dr. Seuss—“I meant what I said and I said what I
meant” from Horton Hatches an Egg and “Be who you are and say what you feel,
because those who mind don’t matter and those who matter don’t mind,” attributed
generally to Dr. Seuss. See Dr. Seuss Quotes, THE QUOTATIONS PAGE,
http://www.quotationspage.com/quotes/Dr._Seuss/ (last visited Mar. 12, 2011).
50
See Quotations by General George S. Patton, http://www.generalpatton.com/
quotes.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2011) (“Say what you mean and mean what you
say.”).
44
45
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Understanding Context

In everyday conversation, the content, or information
communicated, is based not only on the words used, but also on
context. Consider an example: A wounded woman asks an
emergency room physician if she is going to die. 51 The doctor
responds simply, “you are not going to die.” 52 Despite the doctor’s
response, there is no reason to question our ideas about
mortality. Although the plain meaning of the utterance would
suggest otherwise, the content conveyed by the conversation is
not that the patient is immortal but rather that she will not die
from her current wounds. 53 This is an instance where context
provides additional, and perhaps more important, data to the
words actually used. The context of the situation, plus the
speaker’s and hearer’s shared knowledge that no one lives
forever, enhance the content of the utterance and provide a
richer, more accurate meaning for the information conveyed.
Context also enriches ordinary conversation where the same
responsive utterance may be intended to mean various things in
different situations. 54 For example, if a man is asked if he has
two children and he responds “yes,” the understanding is that he
has exactly two children, no more and no less. 55 Yet, if a man is
asked if he has two beers in his refrigerator and he responds
“yes,” the likely information intended to be conveyed is that he
has at least two beers and perhaps more. 56 The extra content
conveyed by context in these examples is more subtle, yet it

See Marmor, supra note 10, at 426.
See id. Marmor also provides a similar example of a bartender who tells a
teenager that he “must be 21 years old to drink.” Id. The speaker and the hearer
understand that you need to be 21 or older to drink, not precisely 21. See id. The
context of the dialogue, that speaker and hearer are in a bar, adds the detail that it
is likely alcohol and not apple juice that can only be drank by persons 21 or older.
See id.
53
See id.
54
These examples, and others highlighting how conversational context enhances
meaning, are found in Scott Soames, Interpreting Legal Texts: What Is, and What is
Not, Special About the Law, in 1 PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS 403, 411 (2009).
55
See id.
56
See id. (“ ‘Exactly,’ ‘at least’ . . . —these are additions to what is asserted,
generated by special features of the context of utterance, over and above [the words
themselves]. In all these cases, what is communicated isn’t the semantic content of
the sentence uttered, but something richer, to which meaning and obvious
background assumptions have both contributed.”).
51
52
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shows that context and shared understanding can only be
ignored at the risk of not fully understanding the meaning of the
utterance.
Although context can be derived from a variety of sources,
one place that context can be found is in the “conversation” itself,
or the dialog that occurs between the speaker and the hearer.
Looking carefully at a conversation, we learn “an important truth
about ordinary speech”: Speakers in everyday conversation leave
much unsaid, depending on context to carry the intended
meaning. 57 Despite the amount of unspoken content, everyday
conversation goes on, relatively, without a hitch. This is because
speakers rely on information that can be implied or derived from
the circumstances surrounding the conversation—who is
participating, when the conversation occurs, where the
conversation occurs, and so on—as well as information present in
These
the speaker’s and hearer’s shared background. 58
implications allow for a much more detailed understanding of the
content being conveyed.
Linguist and philosopher H. Paul Grice examined
conversation-based context, focusing in part on the meaning
intended by the speaker, the linguistic meaning of the utterance
itself, and the interrelations between these two meanings. 59 In
particular, he analyzed conversation, observing that everyday
exchanges are typically about a topic known to the participants,
about which they have shared general knowledge to which the
conversation adds, and which refines the shared general

McGreal, supra note 18, at 325–26.
See id. at 325. Because speakers and hearers have expectations about the
content of everyday conversation, the fact that much is left unsaid does not cause
problems, as discussed below. See id. at 346 (“These expectations help to winnow out
the inappropriate readings of an ambiguous sentence, to piece together fractured
utterances, to excuse slips of the tongue, to guess the referents of pronouns and
descriptions, and to fill in the missing steps of an argument.” (quoting PINKER, supra
note 18, at 228–29)).
59
See Richard E. Grandy & Richard Warner, Paul Grice, in STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/grice/ (Edward N.
Zalta ed., last updated Mar. 23, 2009).
57
58
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knowledge. 60 Grice termed the enhanced meaning provided by
the context of the exchange “conversational implicature.” 61
Conversational implicature makes it possible to derive
additional information above and beyond the content of the
utterances. 62 Consider an example: Man X is standing near his
car on the side of a road. It is evident that the car has run out of
gas. He asks for help from woman Y, a local person who passes
by. Y says to X, “There is a gas station in the next town.” 63
While Y has not actually said she knows that the station is open,
is the closest station, and has gas to sell, it can be implied from
the conversation that this is information that Y intended to
convey. 64 This makes sense to us as regular participants in
everyday conversation, but how does conversational implicature
work?
Grice begins his explanation of conversational implicature
with the initial premise that everyday conversation is a
cooperative enterprise. 65 In its idealized form, the speaker
abides by the following principle: “Make your conversational
contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs,
by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in
which you are engaged.” 66 Others have recast this theme to
reflect more clearly that conversation is intended to convey
information from speaker to hearer: “[A]gents will not speak
obscurely in attempting to communicate.” 67 Cooperation is
required for efficient, not to mention successful, conversation. 68
60
See Sinclair, supra note 10, at 384–85; see also Paul Grice, Logic and
Conversation, in STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WORDS 22, 29 (1991) (referring to ideal
cooperative conversations as those in which the participants “have some common
immediate aim,” the participants’ contributions should be “dovetailed, mutually
dependent,” and the “transaction should continue in appropriate style”).
61
Wayne Davis, Implicature, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY,
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/implicature (last updated Sept. 22, 2010).
62
Paul Grice, Presupposition and Conversational Implicature, in RADICAL
PRAGMATICS 183, 184–85 (Peter Cole ed., 1981).
63
Grice provides this example in more continental terms, such as “petrol” and
“garage,” but the gist of the exchange remains the same. See Grice, supra note 60, at
32.
64
See id.
65
See id. at 26.
66
Id.
67
See Miller, supra note 11, at 189–90 n.62 (citing GEORGIA M. GREEN,
PRAGMATICS AND NATURAL LANGUAGE UNDERSTANDING 91 (2d ed. 1996)).
68
McGreal, supra note 18, at 343.
The efficiency . . . depends on the participants’ sharing a lot of background
knowledge about the events and about the psychology of human behavior.
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From the general principle of cooperation, Grice develops
conversational implicature by devising four categories of maxims
related to everyday conversation: quantity, quality, relation,
and manner. 69 Under the maxim of quantity, a speaker’s
contributions should be as informative as required for the
current purposes of the conversation but should not provide too
much, or extraneous, information. 70 The maxim of quality
discourages the speaker from making statements that the
speaker believes to be false or for which he lacks adequate
evidence or knowledge. 71 The maxim of relation simply requires
that the speaker strive to be relevant. 72 Finally, the maxim of
manner is related to form, rather than substance; the speaker
should avoid obscure expressions, ambiguity, verbosity, and
disorder. 73
Speakers are, of course, not bound by these maxims; in fact,
the guidelines may even conflict at times. 74 But, in the complete
absence of these ideals, conversation would fail. 75 If instead we
can assume that the speaker is acting in accord with the general
principle of cooperation and the maxims that flow from it, we can
also make inferences that extend beyond the semantic content
imparted by the words alone. 76 There is content above and

They must use this knowledge to cross-reference the names, pronouns, and
descriptions with a single cast of characters, and to fill in the logical steps
that connect each sentence with the next. If background assumptions are
not shared—for example, if one’s conversational partner is from a very
different culture, or is schizophrenic, or is a machine—then the best
parsing [of grammar] in the world will fail to deliver the full meaning of a
sentence.
Id. (quoting PINKER, supra note 18, at 227) (internal quotation marks omitted).
69
See Grice, supra note 60, at 26.
70
See id. at 26–27.
71
See id. at 27.
72
See id.
73
See id. The maxim of manner is, not surprisingly, the most often violated. See
Sinclair, supra note 10, at 380.
74
See Sinclair, supra note 10, at 382. This is a unique feature of pragmatics. In
contrast, consider syntax (grammar rules) or semantics (word definitions). If a
speaker violates rules of syntax or semantics, the speaker will fail to communicate
anything. Absent English syntax, the speaker is not speaking English. See id. at
383. Further, while the rules of pragmatics, or Grice’s maxims, should be violated in
certain contexts—for example, in the event of cross-examination in a courtroom, the
maxim of quantity is often a deliberate casualty—the rules of syntax and semantics
cannot be. See id. at 383–85.
75
See id. at 382.
76
See id. at 380–81.
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beyond the utterance that can be derived from the fact that the
speaker used these particular words and used them at this point
in the conversation. 77
Grice provides a number of illustrations where
conversational implicature provides additional information.
Consider two people talking about a mutual friend who has
recently gotten a job in a bank. One person asks the other how
the friend likes his new job, and the other person replies, “Oh
quite well, I think; he likes his colleagues, and he hasn’t been to
prison yet.” 78 This may seem like an unusual remark, but it
illuminates far more information than what is conveyed by the
utterance. 79 It appears that the second person is communicating
to the first that their mutual friend is potentially dishonest. 80
The first person may be aware of this peculiar quality in the
friend; if not, he is entitled to ask the second person exactly what
is meant. 81 If the friend were known by both people to be an
honest person, then the second person’s remark would have
violated the maxim of relevance or perhaps quality. 82 But if we
assume that the speech follows the maxims, we arrive at the
implicature that the second person’s remark refers to the mutual
friend’s dishonesty. 83
Consider again the example of the man X who has run out of
gas and the passerby Y who states, “There is a gas station in the
next town.” 84 If Y is observing the maxims of conversation, it
then follows that Y intends to convey that the station is indeed
open, is the nearest station, and will sell gas. 85 If Y does not
intend to convey this, her utterance violates the maxims of
relevance and quality.
Consider a final, and more nuanced, example: Two persons,
A and B, are planning a trip to France, where A hopes to visit a
third person, C. 86 If A asks B, “Where does C live,” and B replies,
“Somewhere in the South of France,” then we—and A—can
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86

See id. at 381.
Grice, supra note 60, at 24.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 32.
See id.
Id.
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deduce that B may not know exactly where C lives. 87 If B knew
more precisely where C lived, B would be required by the maxim
of quantity to indicate as much. 88 If B did not know but had
simply guessed where C lived, B would have violated the maxim
of quality. 89 Thus, the conversational implicature, assuming B is
following the maxims, is that B does not know precisely where C
lives. 90
In each of these examples, the information exchanged in the
actual utterances is incomplete. Yet because of conversational
implicature, we are able to comprehend the meaning as intended
by the speaker. There are times in patent law where the
information exchanged may be similarly lacking.
Patent
conversations, by contrast, are not cooperative; therefore we are
generally unable to apply conversational implicature in the same
way to achieve a comprehensive understanding. This insight will
be helpful in later examining patent conversation.
In addition to conversational implicature as described above,
there are other examples of information left unsaid in everyday
conversation. For example, what was once a conversational
implicature has been used so frequently that the utterance has
become an idiomatic expression, where the utterance takes on a
common meaning that exists even absent the cooperative nature
of the conversation. 91 One instance of this is the commonly used
phrase, “Do you have the time?” 92 Unless the respondent is being
sarcastic, the answer to this question is not “yes” but rather, the
current time. And yet, the content of the question as uttered can
be faithfully answered in the affirmative. The longstanding use
of this question, however, has made it so that the phrase has a
meaning independent of context and shared background
knowledge.
In a nutshell, context is absolutely necessary to ensure
appropriate interpretation. Reliance on abstract, semantic, or
out-of-context meanings of the words of an utterance will
undoubtedly lead to frequent erroneous interpretations. 93
See id. at 32–33.
See id.
89
See id.
90
See id.
91
See Marmor, supra note 10, at 433.
92
Id.
93
See Kirgis, supra note 39, at 292–93 (“[L]inguistic meaning’s promise of
simplified, objective interpretations is illusory.”).
87
88
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Ambiguity and vagueness complicate interpretation, particularly
because words often have more than one definition; in fact, even
the rare word that only has one meaning can acquire additional
non-standard meanings based on context. 94 Stability of meaning
may also affect interpretation of an utterance; even in the same
situational context, definitions of words change by region, by
time, and by individual. Finally, the simplicity of the semantic
meaning—the interpretation of utterances without looking to
context—does not avoid searching for a speaker’s intent.
Instead, as others have argued, the plain text/utterance inquiry
merely relocates the question of intent to some other aspect of
the analysis. 95
On the flipside, interpretation based on context has often
been criticized as inefficient at best or result driven at worst.
Yet, the alternative is similarly unattractive:
Where an
utterance is taken without context, the hearer is left to simply
“invent” a context to understand what is being said. 96 Whether
or not we admit that we are using context, language
interpretation necessarily entails its use. 97 We need to consider
the context of the utterance; it is not enough to consider simply
the semantics or mere words being used. 98
The key insight for the purposes of this Article is not the
development of the conversational implicature. The interesting
thing is how the underlying premise of cooperation leads to the
implicature that quite naturally shapes our understanding of
everyday conversation. We do not consciously apply the maxims.
Everyday conversation results in successful communication not
because of conscious efforts to be relevant or to only state as

94
Consider the term “cookie”: For much of time, this word had a single stable
meaning, that of a sweet treat. However, the term has taken on a secondary, nonstandard meaning in the Internet context as a small piece of data left on a computer
by a web browser. See, e.g., Peter Meijes Tiersma, Comment, The Language of Offer
and Acceptance: Speech Acts and the Question of Intent, 74 CAL. L. REV. 189, 207
(1986) (“Even words which have only one dictionary meaning can develop other
meanings through metaphorical extension. At the other extreme, a word such as
‘right’ has a large variety of dictionary meanings. Context will usually allow the
hearer to extrapolate the intended meaning.”).
95
See Kirgis, supra note 39, at 292.
96
See McGreal, supra note 18, at 338.
97
See id.
98
See Marmor, supra note 10, at 423 (“It has been long noticed by linguists and
philosophers of language, however, that the content of linguistic communication is
not always fully determined by the meaning of the words and sentences uttered.”).
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much information as we know to be true but because of the
underlying tenet of cooperation. What if cooperation became an
integral part of the patent conversation? Would understanding
patent conversation be more like everyday conversation?
Remember, everyday conversation is easy.
II. PATENT AS CONVERSATION
Understanding patents is hard. Describing a new invention
with old words cannot be easy. Ambiguity and indeterminacy
may seem inevitable. But perhaps, if we draw on what we know
about everyday conversation, we can gain insight about how to
better understand patents. This is not too much of a stretch.
Even though everyday conversation is often vocal, while patent
conversation is generally non-vocal, both are verbal
communications in that they rely on language to exchange
While it is assumed, as it is in everyday
information. 99
conversation, that the parties to patent conversations speak the
same language, 100 these conversations generally impose a
higher level of presumed fluency on participants because patents
include a mix of technical and legal information, often
inseparably intertwined. 101 This presumption of heightened
fluency is manifest in the axiom that patent conversations are to
be interpreted objectively from the viewpoint of a “person having
ordinary skill in the art,” or “PHOSITA.” 102 Additionally, patent
99
The conversations that give rise to the patent itself and the patent document
both rely primarily on language. The content of a patent may be supplemented with
drawings or diagrams to clarify the written words. See 35 U.S.C. § 113 (2006)
(requiring drawings whenever necessary to understand the invention).
100
See 37 C.F.R. § 1.52(b), (d) (2011) (requiring patent applications to be in the
English language or accompanied by an English translation of the patent
application); Joseph Scott Miller & James A. Hilsenteger, The Proven Key: Roles and
Rules for Dictionaries at the Patent Office and the Courts, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 829, 891
(2005).
101
See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 389 (1996); see
also Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 123, 160 (2006)
(noting that the Federal Circuit “has shifted the patent from being a technical
document to a legal one”).
102
See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc);
Arti K. Rai, Specialized Trial Courts: Concentrating Expertise on Fact, 17 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 877, 881 (2002) (“[The] plain language should be interpreted not from the
perspective of the ordinary speaker of English but, rather, from the vantage point of
a ‘person having ordinary skill in the art’ (‘PHOSITA’).”).
It is not just any “art” that the PHOSITA is skilled in; rather, he must be skilled in
the “relevant technological art” of the invention. See Golden, supra note 6, at 326
(citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313–14).
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conversations, like everyday conversations, are typically confined
to a single topic. Claims in a patent, in fact, are required to be
limited to a single invention 103 and in this way may be closer to
ideal conversation.
There are at least two exchanges of information in patent
law that can be justifiably analogized to everyday conversation.
First, in the patent acquisition process, there is a series of
communications between the inventor and the Patent Office,
known as “prosecution,” during which the Patent Office
determines whether and to what extent the invention merits
granting the inventor a limited monopoly. 104 Second, after the
patent and its accompanying monopoly is granted, the patent
document itself has the daunting task of conveying information
about the scope of the patent holder’s territory of exclusion to a
diverse audience including competitors, attorneys, judges,
venture capitalists, and in some respects the general public. 105
Construction of terms used in patent claims is implicated in
both the conversation between the inventor and the Patent Office
during acquisition and the conversation between the patent and
the public post-grant. However, there are distinctions that
require addressing additional characteristics of each type of
patent conversation separately.

See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 121 (2006) (allowing the Patent Office to require
multiple applications to be filed if the application includes multiple independent and
distinct inventions); Monsanto Chem. Co. v. Coe, 145 F.2d 18, 19 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1944)
(“Two or more independent inventions can not be claimed in one application.”).
104
See, e.g., F. Scott Kieff, The Case for Registering Patents and the Law and
Economics of Present Patent-Obtaining Rules, 45 B.C. L. REV. 55, 70–71 (2003). The
purpose of the claims is to delineate the extent of the patent’s scope, which must be
determined both prior to the grant of the patent over the invention as well as postgrant to evaluate the patent’s validity and infringement of the patent. See, e.g.,
Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Claim Interpretation and Information Costs, 9
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 57, 62–63 (2005) (describing how the scope of the invention
is critical to the inventor, the patent attorney, the examiner at the U.S. Patent &
Trademark Office, the holder of the issued patent, the competitor, and the courts);
Golden, supra note 6, at 322.
105
See Nard, supra note 1, at 40–41 (stating that patent claims provide a
boundary that competitors attempt to design around); see also Cotropia, supra note
104, at 63 (noting, in addition to competitors, that patents provide important
information to potential investors or purchasers of the patented technology); Golden,
supra note 6, at 322–23.
103
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The conversation between the inventor and the Patent Office
begins when the inventor submits to the Patent Office a patent
application, which must conform to a number of statutory
requirements. 106 While some of these constraints are formalistic,
such as requiring payment and an oath, 107 other conditions are
more substantive. In particular, the application must include a
written “specification” that describes the invention in sufficient
detail to enable a PHOSITA to make and use the invention. 108
The application concludes with a list of written “claims,” which
define the territory of exclusion by “particularly pointing out and
distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant
regards as his invention.” 109 The subject matter of these claims
must meet the statutory requirements of patentability—namely,
it must be useful, novel, and non-obvious. 110
To determine if the patent application fulfills these
requirements, a Patent Office examiner must first interpret the
claims. 111 For this purpose, the examiner is to give claim terms
their broadest reasonable construction in light of the
specification. 112 After establishing what the claims mean, the
examiner assesses the patentability of the invention by searching
for prior art or known information that relates to the claims at

The patent application discussed in this Article is a non-provisional utility
patent application. There are, of course, design and plant patent applications, as
well as provisional utility patent applications, but these are not the subject of this
Article.
107
See U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF
PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 601.01 (8th ed., 8th rev. 2010).
108
See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006). In addition to the description of the invention and
how to make and use it, the specification also includes an abstract and often
drawings or diagrams.
109
See id. Claims may be independent or dependent, but each patent application
must include at least one independent claim. Dependent claims reference a previous
claim and incorporate all the limitations of that claim, plus one or more additional
limitations.
110
The requirements of patentability are specified by 35 U.S.C. § 101 (utility),
35 U.S.C. § 102 (novelty), and 35 U.S.C. § 103 (non-obviousness). The requirements
of 35 U.S.C. § 112 (enablement) must also be met for a patent to be allowed.
111
See Mullally, supra note 6, at 336.
112
See In re Buszard, 504 F.3d 1364, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2007); In re Zletz, 893 F.2d
319, 321 (Fed. Cir. 1989); In re Yamamoto, 740 F.2d 1569, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
106
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issue. 113 The examiner compares the claims of the application to
the prior art and determines which meet the patentability
requirements—for example, the examiner determines if the
invention is non-obvious in light of the prior art. 114 If there are
claims that do not meet the patentability requirements, the
examiner sends the inventor a notice of rejection for those
claims. 115 The inventor can then overcome the rejection, either
by amending the claim to narrow or clarify its scope or by
explaining why the rejected claim of his invention is different
from what is disclosed in the prior art. 116 The process of
examination, rejection, and amendment/argument may include
multiple iterations, 117 not unlike the back-and-forth nature of
everyday conversation. The result of a successful conversation is
an issued patent. 118 The entire conversation, including the
application and all communications between the Patent Office
and the inventor, is collected in a publicly available file known as
the “prosecution history.” 119
The conversation between the inventor and the Patent Office
includes a number of “utterances.” The originally-filed patent
application can be considered a series of utterances—with the
claims being of particular significance—followed by the various
iterations of prosecution as subsequent utterances. The inventor
serves up the initial offer, the examiner counters, the inventor
responds, and so forth. At every step, each of the parties is
conveying information to the other side with the intent of
See Cotropia, supra note 104, at 62.
See id.
115
See Mullally, supra note 6, at 348.
116
See Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A. Moore, Ending Abuse of Patent
Continuations, 84 B.U. L. REV. 63, 67 (2004).
117
See id. at 66.
118
Kieff, supra note 104. This notion of success is a bit subjective; for example,
some may consider an instance where a patent does not issue because the invention
does not warrant protection to be a success. However, taking the perspective of the
inventor for the purposes of this Article, a successful outcome presumes the grant of
patent protection.
119
Prosecution histories typically include contents such as the originally filed
application, Office Actions generated by the Patent Office, inventor responses to
Office Actions, examiner search notes, and other data or affidavits submitted by the
inventor. See Thomas, supra note 11. The completeness of the prosecution history as
a record of the conversation between the inventor and the Patent Office has been
questioned. See id. at 186 (“Patent Office generation of these texts remains uneven,
often leaving surprising gaps in the sequence of events commencing with a filed
application and culminating in a granted patent.”).
113
114
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reaching a compromise about the patent’s exclusionary scope.
The entire conversation is essentially a negotiation about what
exclusionary territory should be granted to the inventor. The
exclusionary territory negotiated is based exclusively on the
claims, but the interpretation of the claims, either at the Patent
Office during the acquisition process or in later patent
infringement proceedings, relies on the understanding of the
other utterances, such as the specification portion of the original
application and the give-and-take of prosecution. Thus, all of the
utterances play a role in interpreting the claims.
2.

Comparison to Everyday Conversation

The patent application conversation has much in common
with everyday conversation. In addition to relying on language
and relating to a single topic, 120 the patent conversation between
the inventor and the Patent Office shares another similarity with
everyday conversation—both generally have bilateral aspects. 121
Much of the communication during patent acquisition occurs in
writing, but there is a back-and-forth dialog between the parties
that allows for clarification of information. In fact, there is even
opportunity for verbal face-to-face, or at least telephonic,
communication if necessary. 122 A summary of the substance of
this discussion is then added to the prosecution history and
becomes part of the patent conversation. 123
Despite the similarities, there are differences that may
create difficulties in making the analogy between everyday
conversation and patent conversation. Some of these differences
are superficial. For example, because much of the conversation
between the inventor and the Patent Office is carried out via
written correspondence, the speaker cannot rely on extra-lingual
clues, such as gestures or facial expressions, to provide context. 124
120
The fact that the patent conversation is written, while everyday conversation
is most often oral, does not defeat the analogy. Writing is simply a representation of
the same language used in oral conversation. See supra note 33. Further, the
inclusion of technical and legal language in the patent conversation does not render
the analogy inapt because everyday conversation may also contain technical terms
and difficult concepts.
121
Everyday conversation, of course, need not be bilateral. See supra Part I.A.
122
See 37 C.F.R. § 1.133(b) (2011) (setting requirements for meeting with an
examiner); Lemley & Moore, supra note 116.
123
See 37 C.F.R. § 1.133(b).
124
See Sinclair, supra note 10, at 385 (making a similar point for legal speech,
such as statutes).
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Further, patent conversations tend to avoid indexicals, or content
that depends on temporal or other objective context of the
conversation. 125 For example, deadlines are stated as dates
certain—for example, January 1, 2009—rather than “next week”
or “by the end of the year” to avoid ambiguity.
Patent
conversation may also include a list of definitions for certain
terms used, something that is rarely done, and rarely required,
for everyday conversation. 126 These superficial differences do not
weaken the analogy for two reasons.
First, in various
circumstances in everyday conversation, similar modifications
are made. As noted above, when speaking to children, for
example, more direct language is used and less is left unsaid.
Second, for the purpose of making the analogy between patents
and everyday conversation so as to better understand patents,
these differences are actually helpful, by creating more certainty
and less ambiguity than is generally present in everyday
conversation.
There is an additional hurdle in analogizing the patent
conversation between the inventor and the Patent Office to
everyday conversation, namely, the identities of the parties to the
conversation. In everyday conversation, the speaker and the
hearer are generally readily identified, with the only question
being what type of audience is hearing the conversation:
addressee, auditor, overhearer, or eavesdropper. Although the
inventor and the Patent Office would seem to be the natural
choice of parties to the conversation, communication most often
occurs through an intermediary, a patent attorney, who
The addition of the patent
facilitates the conversation. 127
attorney to the inventor’s side of the conversation raises a
question about the extent of the parties’ shared background
See id. at 381–82. One area of pragmatics is concerned with how the facts of
the conversation are relevant to meaning. Indexicals fall under the purview and
include terms such as “I,” “now,” “today,” and “here.” Interpretation of these terms
relies on objective data about the conversation itself. In the case of “I,” it depends on
who is speaking; in the case of “now” or “today,” it depends on the time or date of the
utterance; and finally, in the case of “here,” it depends on where the utterance is
made. See id.; see also Marmor, supra note 10, at 425.
126
In part, this is because patentees are allowed to use words as they see fit, so
long as they denote when they are using the words for other than the ordinary and
customary meanings. See Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 566 F.3d 1282, 1288 (Fed.
Cir. 2009) (“[I]nventors may act as their own lexicographers and give a specialized
definition of claim terms.”).
127
See Knogo Corp. v. United States, 213 U.S.P.Q. 936, 940 (Ct. Cl. 1980).
125
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knowledge; although the patent attorney may look like a simple
conduit, the reality is that the patent attorney’s role is not so
transparent. 128 The patent attorney is not truly a party to the
conversation because his intent is simply to assist with the
conveyance of information; however, he is more than simply a
mouthpiece because he may distill technical information from the
inventor, interpret information received from the Patent Office,
and even add legal and technical information and arguments to
the conversation while communicating, on the inventor’s behalf,
with the Patent Office. 129 This hurdle does not render the
analogy between patent conversation and everyday conversation
moot; rather, it simply requires us to reflect these differences
when developing conversational maxims.
Similarly, other realities of patent prosecution bring up
questions of collective action, a concern influencing both the
parties’ shared background knowledge and the speaker’s intent.
On the inventor side, although the identity of the inventor
generally remains constant throughout the conversation, the
patent attorney working on the inventor’s behalf may vary. In
part, this may be due to the lengthy nature of patent prosecution;
one attorney may help the inventor draft the original patent
application, but another attorney may assist with the give-andtake of prosecution that occurs anywhere from six months to
several years later. 130 The changing of the attorney responsible
for prosecution may be due to attorney attrition, dynamics of law
firm practice, or simply because the original attorney is busy
128
Although courts initially, and wrongly, believed that patent attorneys were
acting as mere conduits between the inventor and the Patent Office, see, e.g., Jack
Winter, Inc. v. Koratron Co., 50 F.R.D. 225, 228 (N.D. Cal. 1970), this view has
generally shifted. Instead, the “conduit” role of the patent attorney has been called
an “inaccurate, and uninformed characterization of the patent attorney’s role in the
preparation and prosecution of a patent application.” Knogo Corp., 213 U.S.P.Q. at
940.
129
For these reasons, at least one scholar has proposed that claims be construed
not from the point of view of the PHOSITA but rather from the perspective of a
patent attorney. See Golden, supra note 6.
130
Lengthy patent pendency is a well-known problem at the Patent Office. In
fiscal year 2007, the average time from filing to first office action—the first
communication from the Patent Office to the inventor in the prosecution process—
was 25.3 months. See U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND
ACCOUNTABILITY
REPORT
FISCAL
YEAR
2007
tbl.4,
available
at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/2007/50304_table4.html. The average
total pendency, from filing to either allowance or final rejection, was 31.9 months.
See id.
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with another project when a response to a communication from
the Patent Office is due. In the same manner, the lengthy nature
of prosecution, coupled with significant examiner attrition rates,
also raises the possibility that different patent examiners may be
involved at various stages during the conversation. 131 These
personnel changes on both sides make it difficult to ascertain the
parties’ shared background knowledge because as the parties
change, so do their backgrounds. The revolving door of parties
also makes it difficult to consider the intent of the speakers,
because it is difficult to ascribe identical intent to different
parties. 132 Yet, the parallels between everyday conversation and
patent conversation exist regardless of this difference; the
differences can be addressed by modifying the conversational
implicature applied.
The most substantial difference, however, between everyday
conversation and this patent conversation is that the
conversation between the inventor and the Patent Office is fully
strategic.
Each party has different incentives driving its
rendering
the
participation
in
the
conversation, 133
communication non-cooperative.
Everyday conversation
131
The Patent Office has a troubling examiner attrition rate, particularly in the
pool of examiners that have direct responsibility for communicating with inventors.
See U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK
OFFICE: HIRING EFFORTS ARE NOT SUFFICIENT TO REDUCE THE PATENT
APPLICATION BACKLOG 1 (2007), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d071102.pdf (“From 2002 through 2006, one patent examiner left USPTO for nearly
every two the agency hired. This represents a significant loss to the agency because
70 percent of those who left had been at the agency for less than 5 years and new
patent examiners are primarily responsible for the actions that remove applications
from the backlog.”).
132
This problem may be exacerbated because later amendments and arguments
made by subsequent attorneys will more likely be responsive to Office actions or be
based on previous amendments and arguments without regard to the specification.
The specification, which originally served as a vehicle for containing at least some of
the shared background information between the parties to the conversation, becomes
less primary as prosecution goes on.
133
This is also true for statutory conversation. See Philip P. Frickey, Faithful
Interpretation, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1085, 1086 (1995) (“[T]he law is attempting to
accomplish two rather contradictory things. It is attempting, first, to communicate
duties to the citizenry in general, and to officials in particular, a use of language
perhaps substantially captured in the linguist’s focus on conventional
understandings. Simultaneously, the law seeks to channel the discretion of
enforcement officers and judges to maximize justice in widely divergent
circumstances. Accordingly, the law superimposes on ordinary meaning all manner
of canons of interpretation, maxims, and exceptions (e.g., purpose trumps plain
meaning; avoid absurd results).”).
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presupposes that the speaker is “mak[ing] a relevant
contribution to the conversation, given the stage in which the
conversation is, and the prior background knowledge of the
Unlike everyday conversation, where
relevant parties.” 134
cooperation is presumed because the speaker wants to convey
information clearly and the hearer wants to receive information,
patent conversation is different. Neither the inventor nor the
Patent Office is aiming to create certainty of understanding
between the parties, 135 a goal at the heart of cooperative
communication.
The goal of the inventor is naturally to obtain as much
exclusive territory as possible. 136 One way to achieve this goal is
to submit overly broad claims to the Patent Office. 137 Although
the patent prosecution system was designed to be interactive,
allowing an inventor to narrow the scope of the patent’s claims in
response to rejections issued by the examiner, 138 the reality is
that patent examiners may not have the time or motivation to
cabin in the scope of the claims perfectly. 139 Further, instead of
expressly explaining what the claim language means, the
applicant most often discusses his invention in terms of the prior
art by describing the other inventions that exist and then

See Marmor, supra note 10, at 429.
See Michael Risch, The Failure of Public Notice in Patent Prosecution, 21
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 179, 180–81 (2007).
136
Other scholars have recognized the strategic nature of the inventor’s
behavior in this conversation. See R. Polk Wagner, Reconsidering Estoppel: Patent
Administration and the Failure of Festo, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 159, 215–16 (2002)
[T]he patentee has both the motive and the opportunity to behave
strategically. Such behavior can take many forms. It might involve
declining to conduct a thorough prior art search, thus transferring this cost
to the public as well as increasing the possibility that the [Patent Office]
will ‘miss something’ and allow the unwarranted scope. Perhaps a patentee
will draw inappropriately broad claims, hoping that the prosecution process
will only minimally (if at all) pare the claims back, thus yielding additional
scope. Perhaps a patentee will vaguely describe her invention in the claims
or (sic) in order to introduce uncertainty about the scope of her patent.
Id.
137
To be fair, there are other reasons why an inventor may submit broad or
imprecise claims; he, or his patent attorney, may not write well, may not have
resources to permit a more carefully drafted application, or simply may not know the
scope of the prior art. See id. at 199–200.
138
See, e.g., In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997); In re Zletz, 893
F.2d 319, 322 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (noting that patent prosecution is intended to remove
uncertainties of claim scope).
139
See supra notes 130–31 and accompanying text.
134
135
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explaining, often in boilerplate, that the prior art does not teach
or disclose his invention. While strategic conduct to obtain a
broad expanse of exclusionary territory drives this behavior in
part, it is also a function of the patent acquisition process, as the
applicant often makes these statements in response to the
examiner’s rejections based on prior art. 140
Another means to achieve broad exclusionary territory is to
submit imprecise claims to the Patent Office and to be only as
specific as necessary to get the patent application allowed. 141
Any vagueness that remains in the issued patent will permit the
patent holder to argue for a broader scope in any subsequent
infringement suit. 142 The strategic nature of the inventor’s side
of the conversation does create some difficulty in making the
everyday conversation analogy, but is not fatal because the
maxims used for everyday conversation can be modified to reflect
this difference, as discussed below. Indeed, as we will see, it is
this difference that reveals what linguistics really has to offer
patent law.
On the other side of the conversation, the goal of examiners
at the Patent Office is to issue valid patents. 143 But this does not
mean that the examiner is seeking to create certainty of
understanding either. If the claims appear valid on their face,
140
See, e.g., Christopher A. Harkins, Choosing Between the Advice of Counsel
Defense to Willful Patent Infringement or the Effective Assistance of Trial Counsel: A
Bridge or the Troubled Waters, 5 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 208, 215 (2007)
(noting that an applicant who distinguishes his invention over the prior art is
necessarily indicating what the claims do not cover, rather than what they do).
141
See Wagner, supra note 136, at 188.
142
See id. at 188, 215–16; see also Gretchen Ann Bender, Uncertainty and
Unpredictability in Patent Litigation: The Time Is Ripe for a Consistent Claim
Construction Methodology, 8 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 175, 210–11 (2001).
143
See, e.g., David Hricik, Aerial Boundaries: The Duty of Candor as a
Limitation on the Duty of Patent Practitioners To Advocate for Maximum Patent
Coverage, 44 S. TEX. L. REV. 205, 222 (2002) (“It is widely agreed that quality is a
significant goal of patent prosecution. Government, industry, academia and the
patent bar alike have long insisted that the USPTO approve only those patent
applications that describe and claim a patentable advance. Quality patents are, in
short, valid patents.”).
However, at the individual patent examiner level, it is doubtful whether the goal
is even issuing valid patents. Rather, examiners receive “counts” for certain
activities, such as allowing patent applications or finally rejecting patent
applications. See U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 131, at 7.
An examiner has a production goal of a certain number of “counts” he is expected to
earn. See id. Thus, an individual examiner’s goal may have very little to do with
issuing valid patents and nothing to do with creating certainty of claim scope.
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the examiners have no motivation to seek clarification of terms
used in the patent application. 144 The examiner, as a surrogate
for the PHOSITA, may believe he shares an understanding of the
terms and thus does not seek clarification. 145 Even when the
examiner rejects a claim, he generally does not participate in the
conversation by suggesting an amendment or proposing a
solution for crafting a patentable claim. 146 Moreover, because
examiners are rarely, if ever, required to testify in patent
infringement proceedings, their interpretation of the claim terms
is not subject to scrutiny, further decreasing incentives. 147
Because communication between the inventor and the
Patent Office is driven by these separate goals, this patent
conversation is not cooperative.
Yet, unlike other noncooperative conversations, 148 the non-cooperative nature of this
patent conversation does not incent the speaker to include
greater information in the utterance itself; rather, to achieve the
broadest exclusionary territory, it is often in the inventor’s best
interest to omit information. And the examiner is under no
obligation to seek the omitted information, so long as he can
perform his task with the information at hand. While fear of
sub-optimal communication may cause a rational speaker in
everyday communication to leave little for contextual
See Risch, supra note 135.
See id. at 200–01.
146
See id. at 195 (“The examiner does not usually suggest or require modified
language as part of a rejection. Instead, the applicant must determine what
corrective action should be taken, if any, in order for the patent to issue, and this
may not yield precise claims.”).
147
See id. at 180–81.
148
In other non-cooperative conversations, such as legal statutes, the speaker is
more likely to include a greater amount of information in the utterance itself and
less likely to leave much for contextual interpretation out of concern that the hearer
will arrive at a contradictory interpretation or will find unintended loopholes. See
McGreal, supra note 18, at 347 (“When a receiver of a message is not cooperative but
adversarial, all of this missing information [i.e., the context] must be stated
explicitly, which is why we have the tortuous language of legal contracts with their
‘party of the first part’ and ‘all rights under said copyright and all renewals thereof
subject to the terms of this Agreement.’ ” (quoting PINKER, supra note 18, at 228–
29)); id. at 326 (“[O]rdinary speech depends heavily on shared context. And that is
precisely why ordinary conversation is not part of the legal drafter’s tool kit. . . . The
more [a lawyer] leaves to context—the unspoken assumptions supplied by the
reader—the more the drafter risks later manipulation of her work product.
Specifically, she risks that the reader will apply a different context. . . . This leads
the legal drafter to write into text information that an ordinary speaker would leave
to context.”).
144
145
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interpretation, the inventor speaker often relies on the
information asymmetry caused by sub-optimal communication to
generate sufficient ambiguity for him to claim a greater scope of
exclusion during enforcement proceedings. 149 Still, the analogy to
everyday conversation is valid, albeit with some modifications.
Everyday conversation and the patent conversation between
the inventor and the Patent Office share many similarities, and
the differences between them, while necessitating some
adjustment, do not render the applicability of conversational
implicature inappropriate. In fact, some of the differences
between everyday conversation and patent conversation actually
yield a more certain understanding in patents. In any case, there
is enough traction that the devices we use when understanding
everyday conversation can be applied to claim construction. And
further, it becomes clear that the non-cooperative nature of this
conversation may underlie many of the perceived problems with
claim construction. This insight is the greatest benefit of looking
at patent law through a pragmatics lens.
With that we turn to the conversation between the patent
and the public, which shares many similarities with everyday
conversation, as well as many of the same differences as the
conversation between the inventor and the Patent Office.
B. Conversations Between the Patent and the Public
1.

Characteristics of this Conversation

Conversations between the patent and the public can take
many different forms, although the communication is always
unilateral. Whatever structure the conversation takes, the ideal
end result should always be “successful communication, by the
patentee to the world, of the scope of the patentee’s right to

149
See Miller, supra note 11, at 184–85 (“Patentees, who are responsible for the
text in their claims, can choose words of greater or lesser generality to define their
inventions. . . . After all, if claim text does not help confine claim scope, claims are
not worth the trouble it takes to write them. On the other hand, if a patent’s power
to exclude reached no further than its claim’s literal terms, patent protection would
unfairly ‘place the inventor at the mercy of verbalism’ and thus, too weak to attract
investments in innovation, would fail of its essential purpose.”).
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exclude.” 150 Thus, the information conveyed by the patent
document during these conversations is quite important—it
delimits the exclusionary territory of the patent holder. 151
The most visible manifestation of this conversation is in the
infringement litigation scenario. A court will look to the patent
to determine the patent holder’s territory of exclusion and
interpret the meaning of patent claim terms to clarify the
boundaries of this territory for a particular purpose. 152 If an
accused infringer’s product or process falls within those
boundaries, then the infringer is liable for infringement and may
be enjoined from using the invention and/or required to pay
damages. 153 When interpreting the patent, the court is to give
claim terms the “ordinary and customary meaning” that would be
given to them by a PHOSITA. 154 In doing so, the court should
look to the words of the claim itself, as well as to the patent
specification and the prosecution history, for context. 155 If the
meaning of the claim term is unascertainable after reviewing
these sources, the court may consider extrinsic evidence, such as
expert testimony, dictionaries, and treatises. 156
See id. at 189 n.62.
In this Section, the right-holding party is identified as the patent holder or
patentee, rather than the inventor, as denoted in the previous Section. This is a
subtle point; patent applications in the United States must be filed in the name of
the inventors. However, most patents are assigned by the inventors to a corporation
or other organization. It is the assignee, or patent holder, that has the ability to
enforce the patent rights.
152
See Cotropia, supra note 104, at 74–76.
153
See Amelia Smith Rinehart, Contracting Patents: A Modern Patent
Exhaustion Doctrine, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 483, 503–04 (2010).
154
Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996); see
also Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473, 1477 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (“It is the person of ordinary skill in the field of invention through whose eyes
the claims are construed. Such person is deemed to read the words used in the
patent documents with an understanding of their meaning in the field, and to have
knowledge of any special meaning and usage in the field. The inventor’s words that
are used to describe the invention—the inventor’s lexicography—must be understood
and interpreted by the court as they would be understood and interpreted by a
person in that field of technology.”).
155
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1318–19 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc)
(noting that intrinsic evidence—the claims, specification, and prosecution history of
the patent—are more reliable than extrinsic sources and should be turned to first in
claim construction). But see Thomas, supra note 11, at 193 (arguing that prosecution
histories are generally disjointed and incomplete and should not be considered
intrinsic evidence for the purposes of claim construction).
156
See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317 (noting that extrinsic evidence—expert
testimony, dictionaries, and treatises—are helpful but “less significant than the
150
151
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But the patent also conveys information outside of the
courtroom. The means by which it does so are less clear, but
competitors look to a patent to determine what territory to avoid,
potential purchasers of a patent look to the patent to determine
what territory is protected to determine its value, and potential
investors look to a patent to determine whether the protected
territory is likely to yield good returns. 157 Patents also signal
other characteristics unrelated to the exclusionary scope of the
patent, such as the technological savvy of the patent holder or
the general “coolness” of the product embodied by the patent. 158
In all of these cases, construction of the claim terms may be less
precise and less deliberate, but the import of the information
conveyed by the patent claims is still great.
There are a few ways to consider a patent as conversation
with the public. One way would be to consider the entire patent
document as an utterance. An alternative way would be to
consider each claim as a separate utterance, not unlike each
provision of a statute that is interpreted on its own but in
relation to the surrounding provisions. Because each claim
represents a particular exclusionary territory to be delineated,
this Article will adopt the claim-as-utterance view of the patent
intrinsic record in determining ‘the legally operative meaning of claim language’ ”
(quoting C.R. Bard, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 388 F.3d 858, 862 (Fed. Cir. 2004))).
In no case may the extrinsic evidence “be used to vary or contradict the claim
language.” Vitronics Corp., 90 F.3d at 1584.
157
Cotropia, supra note 104.
158
Consumers are not actual parties to the conversation, in that they do not
typically read the patent document. Rather, they are influenced by the presence of
the conversation—that a patent exists means that the patented product has certain
qualities. While this is not necessarily true, there is evidence that consumers hold
this belief. In this way, the consumer and others may be viewed as perhaps an
overhearer to the conversation. See Joseph Scott Miller, Building a Better Bounty:
Litigation-Stage Rewards for Defeating Patents, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 667, 732
(2004) (noting that patents are used “to bolster one’s image among consumers as an
industry leader,” as well as to serve as collateral for loans, publicize information
about research and development to competitors and investors, and to track
productivity of employees).
Patents may perform a less than laudable signaling function, normatively
approving as a social benefit something that is otherwise objectionable. See Shubha
Ghosh, Race-Specific Patents, Commercialization, and Intellectual Property Policy,
56 BUFF. L. REV. 409, 449 (2008) (arguing that awarding patents including racial
categorization sanctions racial stereotypes); Timothy R. Holbrook, The Expressive
Impact of Patents, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 573, 581 (2006) (arguing that granting
patents on genes related to characteristics such as sexual orientation, deafness, or
dwarfism communicates a governmental approval that these characteristics are
pathological and should be remedied).
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as conversation.
However, simply adopting the claim-asutterance view does not render the specification or other claims
irrelevant; rather, just like in everyday conversation, the content
of each utterance is influenced by what else is spoken during the
same conversation.
2.

Comparison to Everyday Conversation

Just like with the conversation between the inventor and the
Patent Office, the conversation between the patent and the
public shares many similarities with everyday conversation.
This conversation relies on language to convey information and is
concerned with a single topic or invention, but unlike everyday
conversation, it is unilateral; the public does not have the
opportunity to reply to the patent or seek clarification during the
conversation. Unlike everyday conversation, the conversation
between the patent and the public has no oral voice; any
communication is performed exclusively via the written
document. And because this patent conversation is unilateral
and limited to the written word, there are generally fewer
indexicals, such as “next week,” and other objective contextual
components. Similarly, because the conversation is unilateral
and written, as well as being quite formal, it is often more
complete than everyday conversation, with more information
being expressly stated by the speaker and less left to
interpretation by the hearer.
Just like in everyday conversation, there is a level of fluency
contemplated in patent conversations. The speakers and hearers
are presumed to be competent speakers of the language—not just
the English language that the patent is written in but also the
jargon of the underlying technical field. This competency is
captured by the requirement that patents be interpreted from the
perspective of the PHOSITA, even where the interpreting party
is someone with no technical background. 159 To aid in this
endeavor, the person construing the claim is permitted to look
to referents—physical representations—or senses—abstract
representations or dictionary definitions. 160

See Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, 120 YALE L.J. 2, 32 (2010).
See John Cordani, Note, Patent at Your Own Risk: Linguistic Fences and
Abott Laboratories v. Sandoz, Inc., 95 CORNELL L. REV. 1221, 1246–47 (2010).
159
160
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Just like the conversation between the inventor and the
Patent Office, there are differences between this conversation
and everyday conversation. Because of the realities of patent
prosecution, there is a limit to the amount of information that
the speaker is willing and able to provide.
Thus, the
conversation between the patent and the public is again not just
non-cooperative; it is fully strategic. As mentioned above, the
inventor will attempt to craft a patent that is deliberately
ambiguous, so as to allow the patent holder to shape the scope of
his exclusionary territory based on the activities of his
competitors. 161 Although this uncertainty has been blamed for
the failings of the patent system, 162 the ambiguity plays an
important role precisely because of the nature of language itself.
It is very difficult to describe an invention, particularly one
which must be new and non-obvious, in words; the fact that
language allows for some wiggle room makes the difficulty of
crafting claims a bit less painful.
In addition to the imperfections of language, the discrepancy
of information based on strategy has other manifestations. First,
the patent document, the speaker in this conversation, is itself
the product of a related non-cooperative underlying conversation
between the inventor and the Patent Office. 163 It is impossible to
overstate the importance of this point. The very conversation
that gives rise to the patent is fraught with strategic behavior, as
both the inventor and the Patent Office approach the
conversation with differing goals. The resulting patent cannot
possibly be cooperative, complicating any interpretation of the
terms used. Claim construction, as it currently exists, may well
represent the best that can be done, given linguistic limitations.
See, e.g., Joseph Farrell & Robert P. Merges, Incentives To Challenge and
Defend Patents: Why Litigation Won’t Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why
Administrative Patent Review Might Help, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 943, 966 (2004)
(“Lawyers being lawyers, applicants’ counsel will take advantage of wiggle room in
the conceptual space between a prior art reference and the claims of a patent.”).
162
See, e.g., Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does
Geographic Choice Affect Innovation?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 889, 928 (2001) (“[U]ncertainty
in the boundaries of the patent holder’s property right. . . . will divert resources from
innovative efforts (research and development) to enforcement (transaction or
litigation costs), decreasing the value of the property right and thereby decreasing
its efficacy as a means for promoting innovation.”); see also JAMES BESSEN &
MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS
PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 235, 239 (2008).
163
See supra Part II.A.2.
161
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Second, the patent document may be intended to say
different things to different constituents in the audience, not
unlike the distinctions discussed above with respect to
addressees, auditors, overhearers, and eavesdroppers. 164 For
example, while the inventor may be carving out his exclusionary
territory for competitors, putting them in the position of
addressees, he may be indirectly signaling technical competence
to investors and product sophistication to consumers, where the
consumers may be considered auditors. 165 Based on the public
nature of patents, even if the inventor is not speaking directly to
the public, they are represented as overhearers or
eavesdroppers. 166 Because the speaker, or patent in this case, is
intending to convey different information to each of these
audiences, the utterance must be carefully and strategically
crafted by the inventor and his patent attorney.
Third, patents typically contain at least some technical
jargon as well as patent-specific lingo that may not be readily
understood by different audiences. 167 Further, the fact that the
same words and utterances used in the same patent may be
given different meanings depending on the parties to the dialog
may be troubling. 168 But these phenomena can just as easily
occur in everyday conversation. A quick scan of the news
headlines includes legal terms, such as “subpoena,” “filibuster,”
and “conspiracy,” and scientific terms, such as “antiretroviral,”

See supra Part I.A.
See, e.g., Paul J. Heald, A Transaction Costs Theory of Patent Law, 66 OHIO
ST. L.J. 473, 503–04 (2005); Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 637
(2002).
166
Of course, given the disclosure function of patents, it would be naïve for an
inventor to be unaware of the public’s role as an eavesdropper to this patent
conversation. The inventor, however, may not be aware of the expressive impact of
the patent, which may be analogized to how an eavesdropper may view the patent.
See Smith, supra note 13.
167
See McGreal, supra note 18, at 335 (“Linguistic communities also exist within
groups that share a common language. For example, lawyers and other professionals
use some words in distinct ways. These words are the group’s jargon. It is high
praise to say that the member of a profession can explain her work to non-members
without using jargon. To avoid jargon, the speaker must choose words with a shared
usage among different linguistic communities (e.g., lawyers and non-lawyers).”).
168
See, e.g., Risch, supra note 135, at 204 (arguing that the Patent Office should
adopt the PHOSITA rule of claim construction used during litigation); see also In re
Trans Tex. Holdings Corp., 498 F.3d 1290, 1295, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding that
the Patent Office is not bound by a district court’s claim construction because the
rules of claim interpretation are different in each venue).
164

165
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“nanotechnology,” and “network neutrality,” which may be easily
understood by the legal literati or technorati but may mean
something entirely else to the population at large.
Regardless of the reason, the information asymmetries do
not render the analogy between everyday conversation and this
patent conversation inapt for two reasons: (1) some of the same
issues arise in everyday conversation, and (2) the non-cooperative
nature does not void the utility of this approach; rather, it
provides an insight into linguistic limitations and suggests that
the underlying conversation may be more important for
improving claim construction than the interpretive process itself.
Although some modifications may be necessary, the analogy
between everyday conversation and each of the patent
conversations can be justifiably made. 169 All require language to
convey information and that the parties to the conversation
speak the same language. In some areas where the patent
conversations differ from everyday conversation, the difference
may actually cause the patent conversations to include more
information than otherwise, such as in the avoidance of
indexicals and other context-dependent content. 170 In other
areas, particularly the aspect of non-cooperation, the patent
conversations do not directly track everyday conversation;
perhaps making patent conversations more cooperative is just
what is needed.
Although the correlation between patents and everyday
conversation is not perfect, making the analogy between
everyday conversation and patent conversations provides a
useful framework for providing insight and instruction into how
we can better understand the process of construing terms used in
patent claims. Not only are many of the terms that the courts
construe in patent cases actually everyday words used in an
169
It may be argued that patent conversation is unlike everyday conversation,
because if we understand ninety to ninety-five percent of everyday conversation, we
will be fine. In patent conversation, however, it is that remaining five to ten percent
that is at the center of claim construction disputes. But there are certainly
circumstances in everyday conversation where a precise understanding of the
information conveyed is important, even for banal exchanges such as the where and
when of a date or what a spouse should pick up from the store on the way home.
170
As I argue throughout this Article, the current state of patent prosecution
invites less, not more, disclosure. When, however, it comes to concrete notions, such
as dates, patent disclosure may actually be more complete than everyday
conversation because, unlike everyday conversation, there is no opportunity to
clarify these concrete notions in patent conversation.
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ordinary, conversational way, 171 but the conversation framework
also has utility even for technical words. Further, appreciation of
the conversational aspects of patent law explicates the true
nature of the problem underlying claim construction—noncooperation—and points towards an actual solution: the injection
of cooperation into patent conversations.
III. APPLYING CONVERSATION IDEAS TO PATENT CLAIMS
In making the analogy between patents and everyday
conversation, the first question is how do we understand the
language used in patent claim terms? Just like in everyday
conversation, the search for meaning in patent claim terms
begins with the content or utterance itself, construing the words
used. Unfortunately, in the existing claim construction process,
this is not just the starting point but also the end point. While a
glint of context may arise in the definition of a single particular
word, the context provided by the overall conversation has eluded
analysis until now. This Section first discusses the current claim
construction process: interpretation of the content, or utterances,
of patent claims. This Section then makes the case for examining
claim construction through a pragmatics lens. This Section
provides the background for the final Part that contends that
claim construction is as good as it can be, given linguistic
limitations and that the only avenue for improvement is to make
the conversation between the inventor and the Patent Office
more cooperative.
But first, how are claims currently
interpreted?
A.

Understanding Content

The patent claims define the scope of exclusion, and so claim
construction must begin with the words of the claim. 172 The
language chosen by the inventor is key, because “[t]he
conventions of word meaning and syntax enable us to
express . . . meanings with great accuracy and subtlety and the
skilled man will ordinarily assume that the patentee has chosen
his language accordingly.” 173 The task of claim construction is to

171
172

1998).
173

See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ Per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1248 (Fed. Cir.
Kirin-Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Ltd., [2004] UKHL para. 34.
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give the words chosen by the inventor their “ordinary and
customary meanings” as would be given to them by a
PHOSITA. 174 In the standard claim construction process, at least
during patent infringement proceedings, 175 courts look to the
words of the claim and then to intrinsic evidence—namely, the
surrounding claims, the specification, the drawings, and the
prosecution history, if in evidence—and then, if necessary, to
extrinsic evidence, such as treatises, dictionaries, and testimony
by experts. 176 Unfortunately, this is where the existing claim
construction methodology ends. What is missing is context—the
most important place to look for additional information to aid
interpretation. Not only is context missing from the claim
construction process—except for its limited use in taking the
perspective of the PHOSITA 177—but very little has been written
about its application to this task.
B. Understanding Context
Although the words of the patent claim are of primary
importance, claim construction never occurs in a vacuum—the
“ordinary and customary meaning” must come from somewhere.
Just as statutory interpretation has given rise to textualists and
holistics, patent claim construction has also developed into two
camps. 178 Textualists tend to look beyond the intrinsic evidence
only in extreme cases, 179 while holistics prefer to view all the

174
The words of a claim are generally given their ordinary and “customary
meaning” as understood by a person of “ordinary skill” in the art when read in the
context of the specification and prosecution history. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415
F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
175
This is not how claims are interpreted during the conversation between the
inventor and the Patent Office. There, claim terms are given their broadest
reasonable interpretation. See Risch, supra note 135; supra note 112 and
accompanying text.
176
See, e.g., Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1303.
177
The prosecution history could also be considered context. The prosecution
history, however, reflects the conversation between the inventor and the Patent
Office. It is not technically context because it is the conversation itself.
178
See Holbrook, supra note 6, at 146; Nard, supra note 1, at 4–6; R. Polk
Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding?: An Empirical
Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1112 (2004). Wagner
and Petherbridge actually identify three camps of judges on the Federal Circuit—
proceduralists, holistics, and swing judges. See id. But the proceduralists and
holistics generally line up with the textualists and holistics identified above.
179
See Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 178, at 1131.
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relevant evidence. 180 Just like statutory interpretation, however,
these two positions are not so different—at some point, both are
looking for the interpretation of the PHOSITA.
Although the holistics and textualists purport to look to
context in some circumstances, it is quite limited—generally only
dictionaries, treatises, and expert testimony are considered, and
even then only to obtain the perspective of the PHOSITA. But
context that leads to an enhanced understanding can also come
from other sources, such as from the conversational aspects of
the information exchange. This Section describes how the
notions of conversational implicature can work in the claim
construction process.
Although there are incongruities between everyday
conversation and patent conversation, the conversation between
the inventor and the Patent Office certainly has the potential to
convey contextual information beyond the utterances, or words
that are used. Immediate application of Grice’s maxims 181 may
be unsuitable because of the highly non-cooperative nature of
this patent conversation, but with modification, the maxims
prove quite useful.
The maxim of manner, as a consideration of form rather
than substance, encourages the speaker to avoid ambiguity,
obscurity, verbosity, and disorder. 182 This maxim is readily
applied to the patent conversation between the inventor and the
Patent Office, in no small part because the form of the
conversation is highly regulated by Patent Office rules,
ostensibly to avoid ambiguity and disorder. These rules impose
at least an air of order and clarity on the patent conversation.
Consider, for example, the Patent Office’s rules regarding
antecedent basis. 183 These rules seek to minimize ambiguity by
compelling a degree of formality when referring to elements in a
claim. 184 Thus, the first time an element is referred to, it should
be preceded by “a,” as in “a lever.” 185 Subsequent references to
the same lever are preceded by “the” or “said.” 186 However, if two
or more different levers have been introduced, then reference to
180
181
182
183
184
185
186

See Holbrook, supra note 6, at 150.
See supra text accompanying notes 69–73.
See Grice, supra note 60, at 27.
See U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 107, § 2173.05(e).
See id.
See id.
See id.
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“the” or “said” lever would be inappropriate and a different
referent, such as “the aluminum lever,” would be required. 187
Although everyday conversation may not be subject to this
explicit of a rule, following guidelines such as this lead to
enhanced clarity in that situation as well.
While the formalistic Patent Office rules, such as those
covering antecedent basis, are helpful to avoid ambiguity in
claims, another maxim may also be useful given the strategic
nature of this conversation and the fact that the examiner has no
incentive to seek clarification: “Use words the literal meaning of
which gets closest to what you actually mean.” 188 This maxim
manifests itself as seeking the “ordinary and customary
meaning” during claim construction in the conversation between
the patent and the public, discussed below. 189 Within the
parameters of the “broadest reasonable interpretation” standard
that is currently used in the conversation between the inventor
and the Patent Office, the “ordinary and customary” meaning is
still relevant under the guise of reasonableness. 190 In any case,
inventors are also exhorted to use the most appropriate word or
to provide their own definition by “act[ing] as [their] own
lexicographer.” 191 This maxim, combined with the Patent Office
rules, ideally results in a patent that is clear, orderly, and
unambiguous.
The maxim of relevance, or simply “[b]e relevant,” 192 is
important in the patent conversation between the inventor and
the Patent Office as well, although it is not so easily applied. The
main problem is that it is not clear what exactly is, or should
be, relevant in this patent conversation. To the extent that
relevance means that utterances are to be related to the
invention at issue, this goal is regulated by Patent Office rules,
which require that claims in patent applications be limited to a

See id.
See Sinclair, supra note 10, at 392.
189
See infra Part IV.A.
190
Risch, supra note 135, at 180.
191
Merck & Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 395 F.3d 1364, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(“When a patentee acts as his own lexicographer in redefining the meaning of
particular claim terms away from their ordinary meaning, he must clearly express
that intent in the written description.”).
192
See Grice, supra note 60, at 27.
187
188
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single invention. 193 However, even if the patent application
covers a single invention, relevance is a difficult concept because
of the realities of patent prosecution practice. Despite the
benefits the inventor may derive from incomplete information
allowing for fluid claim interpretations, the inventor also has an
incentive to throw everything but the kitchen sink into his
specification. This is because the inventor is allowed to amend
and add claims during prosecution of the patent application, so
long as the amendments introduce no “new matter” into the
application—that is, support for any added or amended claim
must be present in the originally filed patent application. 194
Although the claims must be supported by the specification,
there may be content in the specification that is not relevant to
the interpretation of the claims. 195 Additionally, there may be
information in the specification related to claims that were
finally rejected by the Patent Office during examination. 196
While some utterances in the specification may seem
irrelevant to this patent conversation, if we limit our view to the
claims alone, the concept of relevance is more pertinent. Because
claims cost money to prosecute, 197 it can be assumed that the

193
See 37 C.F.R. § 1.142 (2011) (“If two or more independent and distinct
inventions are claimed in a single application, the examiner . . . will require the
applicant . . . to elect an invention to which the claims will be restricted. . . . Claims
to the invention or inventions not elected, if not canceled, are nevertheless
withdrawn from further consideration by the examiner . . . .”).
194
See 35 U.S.C. § 132(a) (2006); Janice M. Mueller, Patent Misuse Through the
Capture of Industry Standards, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 623, 637–38 (2002).
195
Although the inventor hedges against adding new matter by including
seemingly extraneous information in the specification, this additional information
may work to his disadvantage. In particular, embodiments that are disclosed in the
specification, but are not claimed, are considered to be in the public domain. See
Johnson & Johnston Assocs. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046, 1054 (2002) (en banc)
(“[W]hen a patent drafter discloses but declines to claim subject matter . . . this
action dedicates that unclaimed subject matter to the public.”). Further, the inventor
must take care in drafting the specification because subject matter may be
surrendered if the specification is viewed as disclaiming a particular embodiment.
See Scimed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337,
1345–46 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Vehicular Techs. Corp. v. Titan Wheel Int’l, Inc., 212 F.3d
1377, 1382–83 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
196
See generally Mullally, supra note 6, at 343.
197
See, e.g., Kimberly A. Moore, Worthless Patents, 20 BERKELEY TECH L.J.
1521, 1531 (2005) (“Patents with more claims are more expensive to file and
prosecute.”).
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inventor thought each of the claims in the patent application was
relevant, or in other words, different in some way from the other
claims in the application.
The remaining maxims of quantity and quality may provide
the greatest insight into claim construction but must be modified
before they apply to the patent conversation between the
inventor and the Patent Office. In the context of everyday
conversation, the maxim of quantity states that the speaker
should include enough information as necessary but not too much
information or extraneous data. 198 For application in the patent
context, perhaps the maxim of quantity should be restated as
follows: “Make each claim cover all of the claim scope you intend
it to, and only the claim scope you intend it to, and no more.”
With this maxim, we can presume that each claim has a point,
that silence is deliberate, and that the patentee is not intending
to seek anything more than the claim states. The problem with
this maxim is, of course, the unfortunate necessity of the patent
prosecution system. When drafting the claim, the inventor is
hedging his bets about what prior art the examiner may find,
what his competitors are doing now and will be doing in the
future, and what minor modifications can be made to his
invention that he has not yet envisioned. The inventor tries to
draft the claims to cover as much territory as he can in order to
capture his competitors and any minor modifications, but he is
also trying to avoid overlap with the prior art. Another difficulty
is that language itself, content, is subject to various
interpretations, so even if the inventor crafts his claims carefully
to cover only what he intends, the conveyed information as
interpreted by the Patent Office, and later the public, may be
different from what the inventor intended. 199 These difficulties
do not render the adapted maxim inapt but instead highlight
how the conversation between the inventor and the Patent Office
would be improved with cooperation.
The maxim of quality also must be altered to apply to this
patent conversation. In everyday conversation, this maxim
discourages the speaker from making statements he knows to be

See Grice, supra note 60, at 26.
This phenomenon can also occur in everyday conversation, where the
meanings of words may vary temporally or in regional usage.
198
199
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false or for which he lacks evidence of truth. 200 In the patent
conversation, this maxim can be boiled down to the following:
The inventor should ensure that “each claim covers only what
you know to be true.” However, this maxim is openly violated in
the cases of prophetic examples and genus/species claiming, both
of which are permitted in current practice. In the case of
prophetic examples, the inventor is permitted to report not just
the results of experiments he actually performed in the course of
invention, and thus knows to be true, but also “simulated or
predicted test results.” 201 In the case of genus/species claims,
courts have held that although a generic description of the genus
is insufficient to support a claim to the genus, a substantial
number of representative species may be sufficient to obtain
rights to the entire genus. 202 That is, like in the case of prophetic
examples, the inventor is purposely and purposefully claiming
more than he actually knows to be true. 203
While ideally we would require the inventor to only claim
what he knows to be true, the realities of patent prosecution
practice make this an unattractive option. Patents are generally
granted to the first person to file an application on the invention,
and so there is a race to the Patent Office. 204 To be the first
See Grice, supra note 60, at 27. To be fair, there are times in everyday
conversation where the speaker makes statements for which he lacks evidence of
truth, for example when making a prediction—“I think the Cubs will win the World
Series this year!”—or voicing an opinion—“Walter Payton was the best football
player ever.” However, in these circumstances, it is generally clear that the speaker
is asserting for which he may not have complete evidence.
201
See U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 107, § 608.01; Holbrook,
supra note 101, at 158 (noting that prophetic examples are “forms of the invention
that the patentee did not actually invent but which would be within the scope of
[the] disclosure”). This may cause a chilling effect on future invention where others
might be attempting to create the prophetically claimed invention even where the
inventor could not. See id.; see also Sean B. Seymore, Heightened Enablement in the
Unpredictable Arts, 56 UCLA L. REV. 127, 144–45 (2008).
202
See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1569 (Fed.
Cir. 1997); Christopher M. Holman, Is Lilly Written Description a Paper Tiger?: A
Comprehensive Assessment of the Impact of Eli Lilly and its Progeny in the Courts
and PTO, 17 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 1, 15 (2007); Seymore, supra note 201, at 145–
46.
203
This statement is not meant to ascribe bad intent to the inventor; generally,
in the case of prophetic examples and genus/species claiming, the inventor is not
purposefully misleading the Patent Office. Rather, he believes and hopes his
statements to be true; he just does not know for sure.
204
See Margo A. Bagley, The Need for Speed (and Grace): Issues in a FirstInventor-To-File World, 23 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 1035, 1036 (2008). The United
States patent system is still a “first to invent” system, meaning that a person who
200
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through the Patent Office door, the inventor must often file his
application before he has completed every experiment he desires
or before he maps out every species of a particular genus. Thus,
by abiding by the suggested maxim of quality, an inventor may
be leaving a portion of his invention “on the table” so to speak.
Again, rather than demonstrating that the conversation analogy
should not be used, this information instead points to the need to
increase the level of cooperation in the conversation between the
inventor and the Patent Office. Interpretation of the patent can
thus be more consistent with how we understand everyday
conversation.
This conversation between the inventor and the Patent
Office then forms the basis of the second type of conversation in
patent law: the conversation between the resulting patent and
the public. The strategic nature of the first conversation, as
highlighted above, gives rise to related difficulties in the second
conversation, where we now turn.
1.

Conversation Between Patent and Public

Just as with the conversation between the inventor and the
Patent Office, the strategic aspects of the patent conversation
between the patent and the public mean that Grice’s
conversational maxims 205 do not apply directly to interpretation
of the patent claims. Additionally, the utterances—that is, the
claims of the patent—are circumscribed by the initial
conversation between the inventor and the Patent Office. Once
the patent has issued, the speaker—that is, the patent—has no
leeway to make adjustments or additions to the conversation. 206
The importance of this point cannot be overstated. Based on the
linguistic limitations on claim construction and the fact that the
patent is fixed at the time of its issuance, the natural, and quite
possibly only, place to fix the interpretive process is in the first
conversation, between the inventor and the Patent Office.
can prove earlier invention may be granted a patent over a person who is the first to
file. Id. However, other nations do not follow this system, instead granting the
patent to the “first to file.” Id. In the United States, there are still reasons why the
inventor may race to the Patent Office, including the fact that he may also be filing
internationally, he may be disclosing the invention publicly, or he may be seeking
investors to commercialize his invention. Id. at 1037–38. In any case, early filing of
patent applications is the norm. Id. at 1036.
205
See supra note 69–73 and accompanying text.
206
See 35 U.S.C. §§ 251–52 (2006); see also Wagner, supra note 136, at 215–16.
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Because the patent cannot be changed after it issues, the
critical side of the conversation between the patent and the
public lies with the hearer.
Thus, this Section seeks to
illuminate the hearer’s perspective of conversational context and
illustrates that many of the guidelines for patent claim
construction are consistent with how we understand everyday
conversation.
In doing so, it becomes clear that claim
construction is as good as it can get, given linguistic limitations;
room for improvement must be found elsewhere. But first, how
does conversational implicature affect the understanding of the
conversation between the patent and the public?
The maxim of manner, namely that the speech should not be
ambiguous or disorderly, 207 is not directly applicable to the
hearer side of the conversation; this maxim relates to the form of
the utterance, which is crafted entirely by the first conversation
between the inventor and the Patent Office. However, a helpful
corollary may be that the hearer should assume that the speaker
is not being obscure, ambiguous, or verbose. That is, the hearer
should comprehend the speaker’s utterance as conveying its
“ordinary and customary meaning.” 208 Interestingly, this is
precisely the tack we take in interpreting patent claims now. Of
course, based on the strategy involved in the initial conversation,
this is not necessarily easy to do, but if we strive to make the
patent conversation between the inventor and the Patent Office
more cooperative, then this end should work itself out.
The maxims of relation 209 and quantity210 align when viewing
the hearer side of the patent conversation. The hearer should
believe that the speaker is conveying relevant information and as
much, but not more, information as necessary for the content to
be understood. This goes beyond the idea of relevance in the first
conversation, which is strictly enforced by the Patent Office rules
restricting patents to a single invention. Rather, the hearer
must understand that what he is being told has a purpose; there
is nothing extraneous. This fits nicely with the already-present
claim construction rule that the claims are to be interpreted
based on the specification. Again, this is something that is
already part of the claim construction methodology.
207
208
209
210

See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
See Miller, supra note 11, at 203–04.
See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
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The maxim of quality 211 is useful in interpreting the
conversation between the patent and the public, but it proves a
bit difficult to work with from the hearer’s side. In essence, the
hearer should believe what the speaker is saying. A more
layered presumption of truth already exists about the utterances
of a patent; an issued patent is presumed to be valid. 212
Typically, however, we view this validity as relating to the
requirements for patentability. But if the requirements of
patentability are met, it can be extrapolated that the utterance
itself is true. Further, if we strive to make the conversation
between the inventor and the Patent Office more cooperative, the
credibility of patent utterances should improve. Detailed in the
following Section are the relationship between current claim
construction methodology and the maxims derived above, as well
as how we can improve claim construction by injecting a greater
level of cooperation into the conversations.
IV. ADDING COOPERATION TO THE PATENT CONVERSATIONS
Claim construction is not broken. This is something that we,
at some level, already know but that has been largely ignored by
the patent academy.
The claim construction methodology
currently used is quite sound when considered, as it should be,
through a conversational linguistic lens. Claim construction is
inherently restricted by linguistic limitations. But the true
insight that we gain by considering claim construction through
this lens is that the means to “fixing” claim construction requires
a change in the conversation between the inventor and the
Patent Office. Proposals aimed at healing what is perceived as
the latest ills are missing the point; improvement can only come
through increasing the level of cooperation in the conversation
between the inventor and the Patent Office.
A.

Claim Construction Methodology Is Not Broken

Although current claim construction procedures are
routinely condemned by scholars, practitioners, and even district
court judges, the criticisms are misplaced. But present claim
construction methodology, as it occurs during the conversation
between the inventor and the Patent Office, as well as between
211
212

See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006).
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the patent and the public, accords with how we understand
everyday conversation.
To be sure, claim construction is
troubled—but we are doing the best we can, given the inherent
limitations of linguistic expression. 213 This comment may seem
controversial, or even heretical. But if we were to wipe the slate
clean and start over, knowing only what we know about everyday
conversation, how exactly would we shape claim construction?
We would give words their ordinary and customary meanings.
The ordinary and customary meaning would be based on the
shared knowledge of the parties to the conversation. This is
simply what we do in everyday conversation.
Oddly enough, this is precisely what we do now when
interpreting patent claims.
The standard rule for claim
construction is to give words their ordinary and customary
meanings, consistent with the specification. 214 The specification
represents one aspect of the shared background knowledge—
shared because it is expressly provided to give context to the
conversation. Further, the claim construction inquiry takes into
account an additional level of shared background knowledge by

213
With respect to the most disturbing aspect of claim construction, namely the
significant amount of uncertainty that exists in part based on the extraordinary
percentage of reversals of claim construction rulings on appeal, the answer might be
as simple as something we know from everyday conversation. See Schwartz, supra
note 6, at 248–49 (finding that 29.7% of appeals from 1996 to 2007 resulted in
reversal, vacatur, or remand due to an erroneous claim construction); Thomas Chen,
Note, Patent Claim Construction: An Appeal for Chevron Deference, 94 VA. L. REV.
1165, 1177 (2008) (noting reversal rates around thirty to thirty-five percent).
Oftentimes there is more than one right definition. See, e.g., Burk & Lemley, supra
note 7, at 56 (noting the “inherent indeterminacy of patent claims”); Chen, supra
(stating that “claim construction is an inherently indeterminate process with no
single correct answer but rather multiple reasonable interpretations”). There is also
empirical support for this point. See Schwartz, supra note 6, at 258–60 (concluding
that claim construction is inherently indeterminate based on an empirical study that
shows judges’ claim construction reversal rates do not improve with the number of
claim construction cases they issue that are appealed).
214
See, e.g., Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en
banc) (“[T]he words of a claim ‘are generally given their ordinary and customary
meaning.’ ” (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed.
Cir. 1996))).
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considering the perspective of the PHOSITA in interpretation. 215
The process we follow for claim construction is solidly based on
linguistic principles for understanding everyday conversation.
But that is not all. A number of the claim construction
canons that exist also find traction in contextual linguistics and
conversational implicature discussed above. As with other areas
of law, these canons are not formalistic and are simply
guidelines. 216 And the canons have been given short shrift in
patent law generally. 217 However, these canons do provide
valuable evidence of how the maxims are already in play in claim
construction and demonstrate again that existing claim
construction is not that bad. Take, for example, the canon that
states that there is a preference for interpreting a claim to
maintain its validity if possible. 218 This canon reflects the maxim
of quality; the patent is presumed to be valid and the utterance is
presumed to be true. To instead choose a construction that
renders the patent invalid would make the utterance false.
Another canon states that an interpretation that excludes
the preferred embodiment of the invention is rarely, if ever,
correct. 219 This reflects the maxims of quality and quantity. As
to quality, the hearer presumes the utterance to be true; if the

215
See Miller & Hilsenteger, supra note 100, at 883 (noting that the ordinary
meaning is the definition that would be given to the term by the PHOSITA).
However, the meaning given to a term by a PHOSITA can change over time, either
because the level of skill of the PHOSITA changes in a given field or because the
words come to have different meanings. See Mark A. Lemley, The Changing
Meaning of Patent Claim Terms, 104 MICH. L. REV. 101, 102 (2005). Additionally,
there is some skepticism about whether the courts truly consider the perspective of
the PHOSITA in claim construction. See id. at 113 (noting that courts consider the
PHOSITA “[i]n theory”). See generally Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent
Law Technology-Specific?, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155 (2002) (arguing that the
PHOSITA standard is misapplied, as well as difficult to apply).
216
See Holbrook, supra note 6, at 144 (noting that cannons aid courts in
ameliorating the inherent tension between goals of predictability and fairness in
claim construction cases).
217
See Mark A. Lemley, The Limits of Claim Differentiation, 22 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1389, 1391 (2007) (“[C]ourts and commentators have paid less attention
to the canons of claim construction.”).
218
See Karsten Mfg. Corp. v. Cleveland Golf Co., 242 F.3d 1376, 1384 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (“Claims amenable to more than one construction should, when it is
reasonably possible to do so, be construed to preserve their validity.” (citing Modine
Mfg. Co. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 75 F.3d 1545, 1557, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1609,
1617 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Carman Indus. Inc. v. Wahl, 724 F.2d 932, 937 n.5 (Fed. Cir.
1983)).
219
See Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1583.
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specification indicates a preferred embodiment, but the claims do
not include that preferred embodiment, then the credibility of the
utterance is put at issue. As to quantity, if the preferred
embodiment is not part of the claims, then the speaker has
included extraneous information.
Yet another canon states that if a claim supports both a
broad and a narrow interpretation, the narrow construction
should prevail. 220 Not only does the narrower interpretation
better serve the notice function of patent law, 221 this canon can be
imposed to incent a more cooperative conversation between the
inventor and the Patent Office, as discussed below. Further,
with respect to the conversation between the patent and the
public, the narrower construction is a better choice than a
broader construction because the narrow one is more likely to fall
within the overlap of the shared background knowledge of the
parties. The preference for the narrower construction also
reflects the maxims of quantity and relevance. If the speaker is
conveying only so much information as necessary to understand
the utterance, then the narrow construction makes more sense.
To support the broader construction, it is likely more information
would be necessary.
As a final example, consider the canon of claim
differentiation, which states that “no two claims in the same
patent should be interpreted to have the same scope.” 222 This
canon reflects the maxim of manner—speech should not be
verbose, ambiguous, or repetitive. 223 Other canons incorporate
the same notion, such as the canon that a term used repeatedly
should be given the same definition throughout. 224 To give the
same word in the same patent a different meaning for various
instances of the word would be ambiguous.
220
See, e.g., Athletic Alternatives, Inc. v. Prince Mfg., Inc., 73 F.3d 1573, 1581
(Fed. Cir. 1996) (“Where there is an equal choice between a broader and a narrower
meaning of a claim, and there is an enabling disclosure that indicates that the
applicant is at least entitled to a claim having the narrower meaning, we consider
the notice function of the claim to be best served by adopting the narrower
meaning.”).
221
See Risch, supra note 135, at 214–15. Of course, a narrower definition is not
always a more definite meaning. See Athletic Alternatives, 73 F.3d at 1583 (Nies, J.,
concurring) (“Narrowness can not be equated with definiteness.”).
222
Lemley, supra note 217, at 1389.
223
See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
224
See United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S.
365, 371 (1988).
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When we look at current claim construction methodology
through a linguistics lens, the process does not seem nearly as
broken as commentators would have us believe. What we need to
do instead is reframe how we think about patent conversations
and realize that we can learn a lot from how we comprehend
everyday conversation. When we do this, it becomes clear that
much of the current claim construction methodology is not only
soundly based in linguistics—the study of how we comprehend
language—but also limited by linguistics in an unavoidable way.
It is this basic idea, not any “magic formula or catechism,” 225 that
should shape our claim construction discussions going forward.
B. Cooperative Prosecution To Improve Claim Construction
There remains, however, the fact that claim construction is
indeterminate, with appellate reversals seemingly being resolved
by coin flip. Rather than taking aim at claim construction by
imposing more layers of analysis or proposing greater deference,
we should return to the linguistics framework, and in particular
conversational linguistics, to determine if there are areas where
everyday conversation and patent conversation can be more
aligned. The area of greatest difference between everyday
conversation and patent conversation—the presence, or absence,
of cooperation—is also the area where changes are mostly likely
to reap tangible results.
What would cooperative patent prosecution look like?
Ideally, very much like everyday conversation. The inventor
would begin the conversation with the intent to communicate
relevant information to the Patent Office with sufficient
specificity to be clearly understood, given the parties’ shared
backgrounds. The Patent Office would be interested in receiving
the information and would participate by seeking clarification for
any ambiguous or vague statements made by the inventor. The
back-and-forth discussion between the inventor and the Patent
Office would have the unitary goal of reaching a particular
understanding for both parties. The resulting patent that issues
after the initial conversation would be the product of a
cooperative enterprise. A patent should reflect the clarifications
that were made during the conversation between the inventor
and the Patent Office, as well as convey their shared background
225

Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
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to the public, who, acting as overhearers or eavesdroppers, may
not have the benefit of sharing the same background on their
own. Between explicitly providing some shared background and
crafting the patent document from a conversation intended to
create clarity, the resulting patent document should be much
more easily construed using our current claim construction
methodology.
The only question that remains is how to make patent
prosecution more cooperative. There are at least three primary
means to inject a level of cooperation into the conversation
between the inventor and the Patent Office. First, both the
inventor and the Patent Office must be given incentives to avoid
strategic behavior in favor of cooperation. These incentives can
take the form of advantages gained by behaving cooperatively,
carrots, or disadvantages for failing to act cooperatively, sticks.
Both can be used to make patent prosecution a collaborative
effort. Second, the entire process of patent acquisition and
enforcement needs to be imbued with an air of cooperation,
created by removing or altering rules that would impede
collaborative behavior. Third, although not specifically related to
injecting cooperation, the shared background knowledge of the
inventor and the Patent Office in the initial conversation needs
to be made part of the second conversation between the patent
and the public, specifically, by institutionalizing the idea of the
PHOSITA. Through these proposals, we can arrive at more
cooperative patent prosecution, ultimately yielding better claim
construction results.
1.

Provide Incentives for Cooperative Prosecution

Creating cooperative patent prosecution must begin with the
initial conversation between the inventor and the Patent Office.
The general principle of cooperative conversation requires the
speaker to speak clearly with the intent of communicating
information to the hearer. Ideally, the hearer understands the
communication based on the words uttered in light of the parties’
shared background knowledge or else seeks clarification. The
reality of the patent prosecution process, however, in fact
discourages cooperation. The inventor behaves strategically to
hopefully obtain a greater scope of exclusion; the Patent Office
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maintains, at best, a laissez faire approach to the conversation.
Both sides are fully entrenched in their positions, and so it will
take incentives to motivate a change to cooperative behavior.
a.

Incentives for the Inventor

Currently, the inventor is not speaking clearly with the
intent of communicating information to the Patent Office.
Rather, the opposite is true. More often than not, the inventor
submits ambiguous or vague claims with hopes that later
interpretation of the claims will provide broader coverage or at
least a little wiggle room. We must do more to encourage the
inventor to draft clear claims. Already, the inventor is exhorted
to use claim terms as they would be readily interpreted by one of
skill in the art. 226 We expect that the inventor is choosing and
using words in their ordinary and customary way, unless he tells
us otherwise. 227 But our exhortations fall on deaf ears and our
expectations are thwarted because the inventor feels the need to
game the system.
We can alleviate the inventor’s belief that he must submit
vague and ambiguous claims by instilling the patent acquisition
and enforcement processes with an air of cooperation, as
described below. But we can also force the inventor’s hand by
making these claims less advantageous. The inventor has the
benefit and the burden of drafting his claims. 228 So far, the
benefit aspect has been allowed to outweigh the burden. To
encourage the inventor to alter his behavior and draft clearer

226
See Risch, supra note 135, at 180. Risch argues that one way to do this is to
change the interpretation standard of the Patent Office from “broadest reasonable
interpretation” to “ordinary and customary meaning,” as is used in patent
enforcement. This Article does not take that position. See id. at 180, 184–85.
227
See Miller, supra note 11 (“A strong ordinary meaning default rule grounds
patent drafting in this set of cooperative, interlocking assumptions by writer and
reader, and thus rejects an errant patentee’s efforts to prevail against the public by
using ordinary-seeming words in secretly self-serving ways. This default rule also
provides another example, in legal interpretation, of Grice’s maxims of cooperative
conversation.”).
228
See id. at 186–87 (“In this milieu, with its normative tilt toward free
competition, the patentee bears the burden of claiming an invention in terms the
interested public can readily understand. Only a readily understood claim marks off
territory sufficiently to put it under the patentee’s sole control, and not all claim
construction errors are created equal.”).
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claims, claims should be given their broadest reasonable
interpretation during prosecution and the narrowest specified
interpretation during enforcement.
Giving the claims their broadest reasonable interpretation
during patent prosecution encourages more cooperation between
the inventor and the Patent Office because the parties will have
to engage in an iterative process to narrow the scope of the
claims to an appropriate breadth. The back-and-forth between
the inventor and the Patent Office is much like a conversation
already. Although there have been numerous proposals to
narrow the default interpretation of patent claims at the Patent
Office, 229 this would actually decrease, not increase, the amount
of conversation, and thus collaboration, between the inventor and
the Patent Office. Encouraging a longer dialogue during patent
prosecution yields greater opportunities to clarify various points,
while a shorter dialogue cuts off clarification. Consider a
discussion between two parties going out to dinner. When asked
where she would like to go, the first party responds, “I like most
foods.” She may say this because she truly does not care, but she
may also be engaging in strategic behavior, perhaps to appear
polite, to impress the other party, or to somehow use her
vagueness to shape the conversation later, possibly thinking “you
picked where we went to dinner, so I should get to pick the
movie.” The second party then participates in the conversation
by giving the first party’s suggestion its broadest reasonable
interpretation and proposes a restaurant or a type of food. The
ball is then returned to the first party to accept the suggestion or
offer a different idea. The conversation continues back and forth
until an agreement is reached. If instead the second party
construed the first party’s answer more narrowly, they may not
engage in this more complete discussion, resulting in a less
developed answer.
On the other hand, when enforcing the issued patent during
litigation, the patent claims should be given their narrowest
possible reading. Although this is a canon of claim construction,
it, like all canons, is not necessarily followed. However, rather
than serving as a canon, this exhortation should be made a

229

See, e.g., Risch, supra note 135, at 180.
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rule. 230 The purpose of this is two-fold. First, it encourages the
inventor to engage fully in the discussion with the Patent Office
to obtain exclusionary scope that is clearly defined by the
resulting patent. Because any ambiguity will be a disadvantage
to the patentee, in that he will not obtain the wiggle room that he
has been granted in the past, he will be incentivized to work with
the Patent Office in tailoring down the initially drafted claim to a
more precisely worded and clearly focused claim. Second, it
forces the patent to work as a cooperative speaker. Remember,
in cooperative conversation, the speaker intends to clearly
communicate information to the hearer.
If the patent is
construed more narrowly, it is likely that it will more clearly
communicate the patent’s effective scope, as well as the scope
that reflects the discussion between the inventor and the Patent
Office. 231
It is possible that, rather than encouraging the inventor to
engage in cooperative conversation during patent prosecution,
the strategy is simply shifted to another aspect of the acquisition
process. Even if some strategic behavior remains on the part of
the inventor, the fact that his words will be held against him
should limit the amount of game playing and encourage him to
draft better claims at the outset, as well as participate more fully
in a cooperative bilateral conversation with the Patent Office.
b.

Incentives for the Patent Office

Of course, the lack of cooperative effort rests not only on the
part of the inventor. As mentioned before, a patent examiner’s
primary duty is to ascertain whether the patent claims are
valid; 232 so long as the claims are valid based on his initial
230
See Miller, supra note 11, at 187 (“The patentee’s freedom of linguistic choice
imposes, of course, a corresponding responsibility on the court system—namely to
enforce the patentee’s word choices for the benefit of the public.”).
231
Another option may be to put greater teeth into the requirement under
35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006), paragraph 2, that claims be definite. I think, however, that
this standard is more nebulous and less workable than imposing a strict rule that
claim terms should be construed against the inventor. Courts have long experience
construing contract terms against the drafter. Contra proferentem is a rule of
construction that states “that interpretation will be preferred which is less favorable
to the one by whom the contract was drafted.” Edwin W. Patterson, The
Interpretation and Construction of Contracts, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 833, 854 (1964).
232
Risch, supra note 135 (“Patent examiners have an incentive to issue valid
patents; since the question for examiners is whether the claims are valid, they have
no incentive to clarify vague patents if the claims otherwise appear valid.”).
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understanding of the claim terms, the examiner is unlikely to
seek clarity as to what the inventor means by the terms. 233 For
the conversation between the inventor and the Patent Office to
be more cooperative, we must demand more of the patent
examiner. In particular, as a hearer and participant in the
conversation, the examiner must seek clarification whenever the
inventor’s statements are not precise. It is not enough that the
examiner believe that he understands the claim terms based on
the background he shares with the inventor. Rather, he must
insist that the terms be precisely worded or that the shared
background be unequivocally stated. This will occur in part with
the cooperative conversation that will flow from the claim terms
being given their broadest reasonable interpretation during
prosecution. The back-and-forth required to narrow the claim
scope will allow the Patent Office to seek clarification of claim
terms. However, the examiner often rests on the background
knowledge that is shared with the inventor and does not feel the
need to seek clarification. 234 Because of this, the background
knowledge must become explicit by institutionalizing the
PHOSITA, as proposed below.
To effectuate any change on behalf of the patent examiner, it
will be necessary to change the performance measures for patent
examiners, who are generally graded based on quantity, not
quality. 235 Examiners should be given the necessary time to
engage in a detailed conversation with the inventor, as well as be
rewarded for these conversations as fulfilling their duties. As the
current director of the Patent Office is beginning to make
changes in the examiner assessment process, 236 making an
alteration that would recognize the value of the communication is
conceivable. In any case, the communication between the
inventor and the Patent Office must look more like bilateral

See id.
See id. at 201.
235
See Cecil D. Quillen, Jr. & Ogden H. Webster, Continuing Patent
Applications and Performance of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office—One More
Time, 18 FED. CIR. B.J. 379, 388 n.32 (2009). This is not the first paper to advocate
for examiners to have more time to do a better job.
236
See Recently Announced Changes to USPTO’s Examiner Count System Go
into Effect, AG-IP-NEWS (Feb. 21, 2010, 7:52 GMT), http://www.ag-ipnews.com/GetArticle.asp?Art_ID=8052&lang=en. Some of the changes involve
rewarding examiners for quality work and allowing examiners more time to do their
jobs. See id.
233
234

CP_Osenga (Do Not Delete)

170

7/14/2011 4:20 PM

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85:115

everyday conversation, where the hearer seeks clarification as
necessary to understand the information conveyed by the
speaker.
2.

Create an Atmosphere of Cooperation

The importance of this conversation between the inventor
and the Patent Office, both for patent acquisition and as the
basis for the second patent conversation between the patent and
the public, requires an emphasis on a more candid conversation,
such that inventors are encouraged to withhold less information
and examiners are motivated to seek greater information where
possible, as proposed above. To allow for and foster this more
open conversation, a few of modifications need to be made to the
patent prosecution system.
a.

Remove Prosecution History from Claim Construction
Methodology

Current claim construction methodology permits the use of
the prosecution history—the record of the conversation between
the inventor and the Patent Office—to be used for interpretation
during the second conversation between the patent and the
public. 237 While this may be useful to convey the shared
background knowledge of different parties, such as addressees,
overhearers, eavesdroppers, to the conversation, it also creates
an incentive for the inventor to say less for fear of estoppel
resulting from his statements made during the acquisition
process. Decreasing the prosecution history’s role in claim
interpretation will yield a more cooperative environment for the
dialogue between the inventor and the Patent Office.
Certainly, open communication is stunted if the parties to
the conversation fear that their statements will be used in a way
that later harms them. And while in some respects this is useful,
because it forces parties to choose and word their arguments
carefully, it creates a very guarded conversation. For both the
inventor and the Patent Office to fully participate in a
cooperative conversation, they need to view their statements to
each other as working towards a common goal of understanding,
rather than as a something that will trap them later. To be sure,
the inventor feels the negative effects of the estoppel based on
237

See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).

CP_Osenga (Do Not Delete)

2011]

COOPERATIVE PATENT PROSECUTION

7/14/2011 4:20 PM

171

patent prosecution far more than the Patent Office, but if we give
more attention to examiner quality, the statements the examiner
makes during prosecution become much more public. There is, of
course, an argument that if both parties’ contributions to the
patent acquisition conversation are not made public, via the use
of prosecution history in claim construction, any strategic
behavior of either party is left undisclosed and unseen. Thus,
rather than creating an atmosphere of cooperation, this proposal
would instead result in a greater ability to remain strategic
without scrutiny. However, this proposal, taken in conjunction
with the proposal to construe claims against the inventor and the
subsequent proposal to relax the new matter prohibition,
removes most of the incentives to behave strategically. If the
conversation of the inventor and the Patent Office is not later
made public as part of the conversation between the patent and
the public, both sides to this initial conversation will be more
likely to engage in the detailed cooperative dialogue that will
yield better patent claims.
But do we not need the details of the prosecution history for
claim construction? No, for two reasons. First, even the Federal
Circuit realizes that the prosecution history yields inferior
information about the meaning of terms in the patent claims. 238
Second, by relaxing the new matter rule and institutionalizing
the PHOSITA, as proposed below, the prosecution history
becomes nearly irrelevant to claim construction. These changes
would ensure that information that is necessary for claim
construction will become more prominent and easily accessible
and that that information be reflective not of the negotiation
process but of the clarified terms that were the heart of the
conversation. In turn, we can remove prosecution history from
the table during claim construction and allow for a more frank,
and thus more cooperative, conversation between the inventor
and the Patent Office.
b.

Relax the “New Matter” Rule

Coincident with removing prosecution history from claim
construction, the prohibition against adding new matter into a
238
See id. (“[B]ecause the prosecution history represents an ongoing negotiation
between the [Patent Office] and the applicant, rather than the final product of that
negotiation, it often lacks the clarity of the specification and thus is less useful for
claim construction purposes.”).
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patent application should be relaxed. The “new matter” rule
forbids an inventor from adding material to the patent
application once filed. 239
While the inventor may make
amendments to and add claims to the patent application, the
specification is frozen at the time of filing. Further, the
amendments and new claims that the inventor may make are
cabined by the information in the specification as filed. The
problem with this rule, interpreted strictly, is that it makes it
quite difficult for the inventor to explain himself more fully if the
examiner seeks clarification of a term. Basically, any benefit
obtained from a full and open discussion between the inventor
and the Patent Office is prevented by the “new matter” rule.
The rule should not be completely eliminated because it
prevents the inventor from adding completely new material after
filing the application, allowing him to comply with the
requirement that he possess the invention. 240 But if we relax this
prohibition to allow any clarifications to claim scope to be added
to the patent document, with respect to both the claims and the
specification, the initial conversation between the inventor and
the Patent Office that ended with both sides reaching a common
understanding as to the meaning of the language of the claims
becomes useful. This has two advantages over the prosecution
history as it is currently used in claim construction. First,
allowing the inventor to add the clarifications directly to the
patent document itself allows the patent to speak on its own in
the conversation between the patent and the public. All of the
conversation is contained in the patent, or the speech; there is no
need to resort to outside information. Second, what will be added
to the patent document is not a series of negotiations, as is the
essence of the prosecution history but rather the final
understanding reached. This allows the patent document to
reflect the cooperative nature of the underlying conversation
between the inventor and the Patent Office. It also allows the
patent document to function as a cooperative speaker, intending
to convey a clear, unambiguous message to the hearer, or the
public. In tandem with the removal of the prosecution history
from claim construction methodology, the ability to add

239
240

See 35 U.S.C. § 132 (2006).
See id. § 112; Holbrook, supra note 101, at 127.
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clarification to the patent document itself should result in a more
cooperative conversation, and ultimately in a better
understanding of the terms in the patent claims.
3.

Institutionalize the PHOSITA

Finally, although it is tangential to creating cooperation in
the conversation between the inventor and the Patent Office, the
knowledge of the PHOSITA should be institutionalized. The
PHOSITA is a proxy for the shared background knowledge of the
parties to the conversation, or the inventor and the Patent Office.
Even in that initial conversation, the PHOSITA is only nominally
acknowledged; in general, the PHOSITA is only recognized as a
reason why information can be left unstated. However, the
initial conversation gives rise to the patent, which “speaks” to the
public. 241 The background knowledge of the parties to this
conversation, particularly on the public side of the equation, is
unlikely to overlap in the same way as the background
knowledge of the inventor ideally overlaps with the examiner.
The public may be judges, investors, consumers, and competitors,
each of which may or may not share any background knowledge
with the inventor and Patent Office, represented by the patent
itself. 242 Because so much conversational context relies on the
shared background knowledge between the speaker and the
hearer, more must be done to ensure the hearer is on the same
level.
One way this could be handled is to require patents to be
written to the level of a layperson. However, describing new
inventions is hard enough as it is. A better solution would be to
make this background knowledge more accessible. There are two
potential, and non-exclusive, ways this can be done. First,
because the most visible manifestation of the conversation
between the patent and the public is in the course of patent
litigation, more resources should be made available for a district
court judge to seek expert testimony to gain an understanding of
the technology underlying the patent. This would give the judge,
241
It may feel awkward to consider the patent as “speaking,” particularly since
the patent cannot have any intent to convey information. This is simply shorthand
for the patent serving as a vehicle to convey the result of the conversation that
occurred between the inventor and the Patent Office.
242
Even competitors may or may not have the shared background knowledge of
the PHOSITA.
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at least for a particular case, some of the shared background
knowledge that we attribute to a PHOSITA. Although the use of
experts for this purpose is already sanctioned, 243 this use should
be strongly encouraged and occur in many cases, not just a few.
Second, a more robust, but more difficult to implement, solution
would be a systematic gathering of shared background
information by technology. In some industries, this may already
exist; for example, a number of technology working groups of the
Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (“IEEE”) have
developed standards and white pages that define various terms
as used in that industry. 244 Other industries, however, may not
have such a developed lexicon. In those industries, it would be
important to create a knowledge database that would reflect the
current understanding of terms used. This database would, of
course, need to be updated over time as technology shifts.
Presumably, the benefits of this knowledge database would
extend beyond its use in patent law.
Finally, there is the problem of those common words—for
example, “and,” “through,” and “a”—that inexplicably form a
large chunk of claim terms in dispute. I have advocated before
for the creation of a Federal Circuit lexicon for this type of
terms. 245 These words do not necessarily reflect a shared
background knowledge possessed by the PHOSITA but rather the
ordinary person, since these words are typically being used in
their ordinary conversational manner. Although in everyday
conversation we brush by these words without giving much
thought to them, the more precise nature of patent claims may
give more reasons to care more about their definitions in this
case. The Federal Circuit lexicon, composed of the court’s
definitions of these everyday words, would be a proxy for the
shared background knowledge between the inventor, the Patent
Office, and the ordinary person. For example, if the Federal
Circuit has said that “about” means “nearly,” then
institutionalizing that data via the lexicon will allow parties to
the conversation to come to the patent conversation with the
same background knowledge as the other participants.

See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318.
See, e.g., Publications & Standards, IEEE, http://www.ieee.org/publications_
standards/index.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2011).
245
See Osenga, supra note 36, at 89–92.
243
244
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There may be, of course, other changes to the patent
conversations that would advance their cooperative nature and,
in doing so, allow for more linguistic notions to be used in the
claim construction process. A more candid conversation between
the inventor and the Patent Office will yield a more generous
disclosure in the patent, which should result in more determinate
claim construction, while not requiring an overhaul to the claim
construction process itself. Looking at the problem through this
new linguistic lens demonstrates where the difficulties truly
arise and how we can make real differences.
CONCLUSION
As long as patent rights are verbally delineated, there will be
inherent and inescapable ambiguity. This Article demonstrates
that, despite what many scholars have argued, the process of
claim construction does not need to be fixed. Rather, what needs
to be modified is the underlying conversation, an insight that
only becomes clear after viewing claim construction through a
linguistics lens. Claim construction is simply the process of
understanding what is being conveyed by the language of a
patent; understanding language is something we do every day.
And so, it makes sense to provide a new framework for
considering claims—as patent conversations.
By analogizing claim construction to everyday conversation,
we can draw on the rich literature of linguistics to help us figure
out how to construe the words used in patent claims. When we
do so, we see that the process in place is actually quite sound.
Various doctrines of claim construction make perfect sense when
viewed through the conversational linguistics lens.
What does need to change is not the claim construction
process, but rather the circumstances of the conversations that
give rise to the patent. Cooperative conversation is much easier
to understand; if we can create a greater air of cooperation in the
patent acquisition process, then we can rely on conversational
linguistics to help understand what is being conveyed. It is not
the claim construction process that we need to change; we need
to reframe how we look at claim construction—that is, how we
understand conversations in patent law—by first considering
how these conversations come to be. Patents can be easy.

